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The Islamic Rule of Lenity: 
Judicial Discretion and Legal 
Canons  
 
Intisar A. Rabb 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This Article explores an area of close parallel between legal 
doctrines in the contexts of Islamic law and American legal 
theory. In criminal law, both traditions espouse a type of “rule of 
lenity”—that curious common law rule that instructs judges not 
to impose criminal sanctions in cases of doubt. The rule is 
curious because criminal law is a peremptory expression of 
legislative will. However, the rule of lenity would seem to 
encourage courts to disregard one of the most fundamental 
principles of Islamic and American legislation and 
adjudication: judicial deference to legislative supremacy. In the 
Islamic context, such a rule would be even more curious, 
allowing Muslim judges to disregard a deference rule even more 
entrenched than the American one: a divine legislative 
supremacy to which judicial deference should be absolute. Yet, 
there is an “Islamic rule of lenity” that pervades Islamic 
criminal law. This Article examines the operation of and 
justifications for the lenity rule in the American and Islamic 
contexts against the backdrop of theories of law and legislative 
supremacy that underlie both. In both contexts, the lenity rule 
acts serves to expand the operation of judicial discretion. But 
whereas the use of American lenity is fraught and limited, 
Islamic lenity is relatively uncontroversial and expansive.  With 
the Islamic rule of lenity, we see both stronger legislative 
supremacy doctrines and more assertions (albeit hidden) of 
judicial authority to legislate. An examination of the role of 
lenity in Islamic law with respect to American law explains 
differences in the scope and exercise of judicial discretion in 
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each legal system. It can also lead us to reconsider common 
public law theories that characterize rules of deference to 
doctrines of legislative supremacy and nondelegation as a 
constraint on judicial discretion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 With new questions surrounding Islamic law in American and 
global contexts comes an urgent need to understand sharīʿa, 
particularly Islamic criminal law, where the stakes are high and its 
landscape appears ruggedly harsh. In foreign constitutional contexts, 
Islamic law has reemerged globally with over twenty-six countries 
adopting constitutions with a clause declaring Islamic law to be a 
source of state law.1 Issues of Islamic law—in particular, 
punishments for adultery, apostasy, and blasphemy—frequently 
appear in U.S. newspapers with important implications for American 
and international law and policy. Such issues have even found a way 
into American electoral politics, as presidential candidates speak 
against the “threat of a sharīʿa-takeover” of American courts,2 and 
several state legislatures have considered bills seeking to “ban 
sharīʿa.”3  
                                                                                                                      
 1. For an insightful view, placing the phenomenon in comparative context, see 
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004) (describing the rise of constitutional drafting and reform 
in over eighty countries, including many in the Muslim world, giving rise to rising 
judicial power over definitions of law). The constitutional status of Islamic law is an 
issue of pending debate in Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere in the aftermath of the 2011 
Arab Spring. 
 2. As early as the Summer of 2010, then-presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich 
called for a national debate on sharīʿa and a federal law prohibiting its citation. Newt 
Gingrich, America at Risk: Camus, National Security and Afghanistan, Keynote 
Address to American Enterprise Institute 7–8 (July 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.aei.org/video/101267.  
 3. One state passed a constitutional amendment, Oklahoma State Question 
755, by a 70 percent majority in a November 2010 referendum, prohibiting the citation 
of sharīʿa and foreign law. U.S. District Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange issued a 
preliminary injunction blocking the new law after a challenge by a Muslim plaintiff on 
First Amendment grounds, and the case is currently on appeal before the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307–08 (W.D. 
Okla. 2010) (issuing preliminary injunction upon finding “that the weighing of the 
harms involved in this case clearly would favor protecting plaintiff’s First Amendment 
rights over the will of the voters.”), appeal docketed, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. argued 
Sept. 12, 2011). Three states have passed bills that would prohibit the citation and/or 
practice of any form of sharīʿa. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2011) (S.B. 460 (La. 
2010)); H.B. 785 (La. 2010), adopted as Act No. 886 (passed June 29, 2010, effective 
Aug. 15, 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-103 (2011) (May 27, 2010); see also S.B. 510, 
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (pending legislative action).  Almost two dozen states have 
proposed legislation or constitutional amendments to the same effect, including 
Oklahoma in the wake of challenges to its proposed constitutional amendment. S.B. 62 
(Ala. 2011) (constitutional amendment); H.B. 88, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 
2011) (constitutional amendment, introduced Jan. 11, 2011); S.C.R. 1010, 50th Leg., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (introduced Jan. 14, 2011); H.C.R. 2033 (Ariz. 2011) (same); 
S.B. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011) (introduced Jan. 20, 2011, amended 
Feb. 1, 2011); S.J.R. 10 (Ark. 2011) (constitutional amendment); H.B. 45, 151st Gen. 
Assemb., 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (introduced Jan. 24, 2011); S.B. 51 (Ga. 
2011); H.C.R. 44 (Idaho 2010) (filed Feb. 17, 2010, adopted Mar. 29, 2010) (non-binding 
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 In earlier American legal history, judicial depictions of Islamic 
law have featured a system rife with either caprice or cruelty. In 
terms of caprice, U.S. Supreme Court portraits have typically 
followed from the famous account of Max Weber,4 describing a 
traditional qāḍī (judge) under a tree, whimsically dispensing justice.5 
As for cruelty, another common view imagines Islamic law to be a 
religious code that adherents perceive as descended from on high, 
expressing the will of an angry and intolerant God intent on 
amputating hands and executing apostates.6 In the first picture, the 
law is wholly unknown outside of the qāḍī’s own mind, and in the 
second, it is crystal clear and relentlessly harsh. 
 Existing scholarship in comparative law and public law theory 
typically offers no better way to understand the legal interpretative 
process in Islamic law than the seductively simple depictions of the 
Weberian qāḍī or his draconian counterpart. The critical insight 
                                                                                                                      
resolution); S.J.R. 16, 117th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (constitutional 
amendment, introduced Jan. 18, 2011); H.B. 1078 (Ind. 2011); S.B. 520 (Ind. 2011); 
H.F. 489 (Iowa 2011); H.F. 575 (Iowa 2011); H.J.R. 14 (Iowa 2011) (constitutional 
amendment); H.B. 2087, 84th Leg., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (introduced Jan. 31, 
2011); H.B. 301 (Miss. 2011); H.J.R. 31, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011) 
(constitutional amendment, introduced Feb. 24, 2011); S.B. 308 (Mo. 2011); H.B. 708 
(Mo. 2011); H.B. 768 (Mo. 2011); L.B. 647, 102nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011) 
(introduced Jan. 19, 2011); A.B. 3496, § 3.b, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010); H.B. 1552, 53rd 
Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011) (introduced Feb. 7, 2011); H.J.R. 1056 (Okla. 2011) 
(constitutional amendment); H. 3490, S.C. Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011) 
(introduced Jan. 27, 2011); S. 444 (S.C. 2011); S.B. 201 (S.D. 2011); H.B. 911, 82d Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (introduced Jan. 26, 2011); H.B. 3027 (Tex. 2011); H.J.R. 8, 61st 
Leg., 2011 Gen. Sess., (Wyo. 2011) (constitutional amendment, introduced Jan. 19, 
2011). And three similar measures have failed to pass. S.B. 1962, 112th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 
2010) (introduced Mar. 2, 2010; failed Apr. 30, 2010); S.B. 1294 (Fla. 2011); H.B. 1273 
(Fla. 2011); H.B. 301, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011) (introduced Jan. 4, 2011; failed Feb. 
1, 2011); Utah H.B. 296 1st Sub. (Utah 2010) (introduced 2010;  withdrawn Feb. 2011); 
cf. Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the US. State Legislatures, 
15 ASIL INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110526.pdf 
(discussing cases and legislation); Carlos M. Vasquez, Customary International Law as 
U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the 
Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 102–03 nn.1–4 (2011) (discussing 
implications of state legislation “exclu[ding] Sharia law” and other foreign laws as a 
method of state regulation of international law).  
 4. See MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 895, 976 (Guenther Roth & 
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1922) 
(“Kadi-justice (Urteilsgrunde) knows no rational ‘rules of decision’ whatsoever . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to 
considerations of individual expediency.”). For additional citations of “qāḍī justice” as 
arbitrary decision-making in state and federal court opinions, see Asifa Quraishi, On 
Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American 
Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 339, 339 nn.1–2 (collecting cases). 
 6. For early American judicial views of Islamic law in federal courts, see the 
survey by Marie Failinger, Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800–1960, B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (“American judges’ references to Islam display 
little evidence of familiarity with Islamic law or the Muslim faith.”). 
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missing is an account that reveals the workings of Islamic law as it 
functioned historically, especially in the high-stakes field of criminal 
law.7 Focusing on that arena, it is worth directing attention to the 
underappreciated area of legal canons like lenity, which turn out to 
be central to interpretive processes in both Islamic and American-
common law legal systems and to closely reflect the public law 
structural considerations in each. Historically, through the use of 
certain legal canons—judge-made principles of legal interpretation 
common to many legal traditions—Muslim jurists developed a highly 
sophisticated and internally regulated method for adjusting sharīʿa to 
changing social contexts in a way that reflected the politico-legal 
institutional architecture and core substantive values of their 
societies and times. The medieval Muslim jurists’ process of 
appealing to these legal canons was comparable, I argue, to analogous 
phenomena at common law. The aim of this Article is to provide a 
historical and comparative account of the legal and social logic of 
interpretation of criminal law in American and Islamic contexts. This 
account of legal processes in criminal law can usefully inform our 
understanding of the judicial power and separation of powers 
concerns in comparative public law theory. 
 For this purpose, I trace the function of a criminal law canon 
akin to the common law “rule of lenity,” a principle of narrow 
construction for ambiguous penal statutes.8 The American rule 
directs judges not to impose criminal sanctions whenever they have 
doubts about the applicability of the law to a set of facts at hand.9 In 
early Islamic contexts, judges invoked a similar principle, the “ḥudūd 
maxim,” which also directs courts not to apply Islam’s fixed criminal 
sanctions (ḥudūd) in cases of doubt.10 Examined together, it becomes 
clear that judges deployed legal canons to translate “legislation” to 
                                                                                                                      
 7. For definitions and the significance of notions of cruelty regarding punitive 
practices in criminal law, see Paulo Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly: Punishment, Cruelty, 
Mercy, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 67 (2008). 
 8. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“The rule 
that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not much less old than 
construction itself.”). 
 9. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B, at 23 (3d ed. 2001) (defining the rule of lenity as 
the legal maxim “against applying punitive sanctions if there is ambiguity as to 
underlying criminal liability or criminal penalty”). 
 10. I use “courts” to refer to the body of jurists that claims authority to “say 
what the law is.” This refers to the judicial power of Article III courts in the American 
context. See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803) (defining the constitutional scope of the American judiciary). There is a 
similar concept of judicial power in the classical Islamic legal context. See CHIBLI 
MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 79 (1993) (applying the Marbury phrase, 
defining the judges charge to “say what the law is,” to jurists in the Islamic context). 
For further discussion of juristic authority and process, see Intisar A. Rabb, We the 
Jurists”: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527, 542–47 (2008). 
In this sense, I use courts and (American) judges or (Muslim) jurists interchangeably.  
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on-the-ground decisions in both contexts, and that canons played 
similar roles to differing effects in the theory and applications of law 
in each tradition.  
 For comparative purposes, a central aim has been to investigate 
the role canons play in legal interpretative processes and what that 
reflects about the scope of adjudicative choice and judicial power in 
regimes that have strong notions of legislative supremacy.  The 
historical and judicial records provide evidence that canons like lenity 
often reflect not only constitutional structural norms, but also core 
values in each system.11 The point is not to suggest any perfect 
parallel or agreement on the content of the public values expressed by 
these constitutional texts, but to indicate how judges deploy legal 
canons like lenity to uphold core values of their respective legal 
systems. While there are certainly notable divergences between the 
modern Anglo-American common law contexts and the premodern 
Islamic one, the sources show a surprising degree of overlap in 
applications of lenity within the confines of the ideals of legislative 
supremacy and other constitutional commitments. This insight can 
provide a useful starting point for further studies as to how American 
legal scholars might better understand how separation of powers 
concerns relate to constitutional and statutory interpretation 
decisions.  
 My argument proceeds in three parts. Part II lays out the typical 
justifications for the American rule of lenity as a principle of 
constitutional structure. Once a doctrine of judicial discretion, 
prominent American scholars and jurists have come to view lenity as 
the “new nondelegation doctrine,”—one embodiment of the principle 
cautioning courts to defer to legislative supremacy. While other 
justifications exist, this structural view of lenity has become 
dominant amongst the most ardent proponents of lenity both in the 
courtroom and in the classroom. Part III turns to explore structural 
aspects of classical Islamic law that often produce an even higher 
premium on legislative supremacy for the criminal law than the 
American context. Part IV queries how the ḥudūd maxim (the 
“Islamic rule of lenity”) operated against that structural backdrop. It 
contrasts structural arguments with equitable ones to show ways in 
which the maxim largely reflected the substantive moral 
commitments of the Islamic legal system as Muslim jurists 
understood them to exist in Islam’s fundamental or “constitutional” 
legal texts. Muslim jurists’ lenity jurisprudence displays their 
                                                                                                                      
 11. The case has already been made for the American system. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1091 
(1989) (observing that American legal maxims reflect “public values” drawn from the 
Constitution, federal statutes and, common law); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes 
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 505 (1989) (defending legal canons as 
representative of public values). 
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emphasis on ideals of equity and fairness above rigid definitions of 
legislative supremacy, though—to be sure—there were limits to how 
far they would emphasize equitable above textual principles when 
they saw a threat to sensitive social or moral values. Appeals to 
equity and fairness through lenity principles reveal the extent to 
which judges in each system understand the extent of adjudicative 
choice with respect to distinctive structural features and value 
commitments.  
II. AMERICAN LENITY AS A RULE OF STRUCTURE 
 The rule of lenity has become the latest, greatest expression of 
the dual doctrine of legislative supremacy and nondelegation—the 
latter being the American rule that legislatures are to make the law 
without delegating that task to any other branch. These doctrines 
carry particular weight in criminal law. Recognition of the high 
stakes of criminal punishment—among them, the potential loss of 
life, liberty, or wealth—have long undergirded the importance of 
allowing the legislature, as a democratically elected body, to make 
criminal law.12 In this sense, one view of American lenity is that it 
vindicates structural concerns of the U.S. Constitution, designed to 
maintain a clear separation between legislative and judicial powers. 
Following that line of thought, we might—as some scholars have 
posited—think lenity to be a uniquely American phenomenon, best 
described as an American principle born of our constitutional 
structure. While that would be a narrow view of lenity, a structuralist 
view of the doctrine is worth exploring, as it drives the interpretative 
scheme of lenity proponents and provides in exploring the lenity 
analog in the Islamic context—where structural concerns are similar 
(if more exaggerated). Before turning to situate the Islamic context 
against this one, we explore the American structural arguments for 
lenity as a rule of legislative supremacy and nondelegation. 
                                                                                                                      
 12. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“Because of the 
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents 
the moral condemnation of the community . . . legislatures and not courts should define 
criminal activity.”). 
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A. Lenity as Nondelegation13  
 Article 1, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution declares that, “All 
legislative power herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States.”14 The conventional understanding of this clause formed a 
robust nondelegation doctrine: Congress may not delegate its 
legislative power to any other branch,15 particularly in matters of 
criminal law.16 But the realities of statutory interpretation and 
adjudication prevented the Court from taking this declaration too 
literally.17 Attempts to apply the doctrine18 continually failed,19 and 
as a result, this version of the nondelegation doctrine has enjoyed but 
“one good year,” when it served to check the expansive New Deal 
activities under President Franklin D. Roosevelt.20 Since, the Court 
                                                                                                                      
 13. For especially useful historical treatments of the nondelegation doctrine 
beyond the sketch most relevant to the lenity discussion presented here, see Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2000) (arguing that the “new 
delegation doctrine . . . asks how . . . the law is being made” rather than “who ought to 
make law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
303, 330–35 (1999) (outlining the “old nondelegation doctrine”). See generally DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE 
THROUGH DELEGATION 3 (1993) (arguing against broad Congressional delegation). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
 15. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“[W]e long have 
insisted that the ‘integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by 
the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative 
power to another Branch.” (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 
(1892))). 
 16. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 349 (refusing “to assume that Congress has meant to 
effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal 
jurisdiction”); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) 
(barring federal common law crimes in deference to “the legislative authority of the 
Union”).  
 17. See, e.g., Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 387–88 (1813) 
(recognizing the nondelegation principle but upholding a disputed statute because it 
issued from Congress rather than the President and did not grant him unguided 
authority); see also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 347 (arguing that despite the theory of nondelegation, in practice, 
there is an unspoken rule that Congress may delegate criminal lawmaking authority to 
the courts).  
 18. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) 
(outlining an “intelligible principle[s]” test to determine whether Congress had 
provided sufficient guidance and limits to “the person or body authorized” to carry out 
the terms of a statute to effect a permissible delegation of its legislative powers).  
 19. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (remarking 
on the problems of judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine and its intelligible 
principles test); see also Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. 
REV. 323, 324–28 (1987) (noting the “absence of judicially manageable and enforceable 
criteria to distinguish permissible from impermissible delegations”). 
 20. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 
(2000); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 330. The Court invoked the doctrine for the first and 
2011]   The Islamic Rule of Lenity 1307 
has declined to invoke the old nondelegation doctrine,21 even when it 
had plausible cause to do so.22 The doctrine’s continued dormancy 
prompted notable scholars to pronounce the nondelegation doctrine 
dead.23  
 Professor Cass Sunstein, however, has convincingly argued that 
the doctrine lives on, “relocated rather than abandoned.”24 It shifted, 
he argues, to a series of smaller nondelegation doctrines that appear 
in the form of canons of statutory interpretation.25 Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Mistretta v. United States: “In recent years, 
our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been 
                                                                                                                      
last time in 1935 to invalidate two congressional statutes, most notably in the 
Schechter Poultry case. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495, 542 (1935) (“We think that the code-making power conferred is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 
430 (1935) (holding that the National Investment Recovery Act “goes beyond” the 
“limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend”). For 
discussion of nondelegation cases before and after 1935, see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (collecting post-New Deal nondelegation cases); J.W. Hampton, 
Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 406–07 (collecting pre-New Deal nondelegation cases).  
 21. A possible exception arose a decade ago, when the old doctrine appeared in 
response to the appellate decision Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (striking down a provision of the Clean Air Act that was bounded 
by no intelligible principle for informing EPA standards to determine when public 
health concern with respect to ozone levels were reasonable), rev’d, Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 472. The Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit decision, with 
a restatement of the older doctrine: “In a delegation challenge, the constitutional 
question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency” whereas 
Article 1, Section 1 “permits no delegation of those powers.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. at 472. But it affirmed the delegation in this case upon determining that the EPA 
standards sufficed as the “intelligible principles” to guide agency discretion. Id. at 474.  
 22. That is, the Court upheld congressional delegations even when the 
“intelligent principle” arguably was lacking. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“I can find no place in our constitutional system for an agency created 
by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws.”); 
United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (upholding the 
Communication Act’s delegation of authority to the FCC to regulate cable television to 
the extent it was “reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's 
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting”); Lichter v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 742, 785–86 (1948) (upholding Renegotiation Act’s delegation to the 
War Department to recover “excessive profits” on war contracts even though “excessive 
profits” was not defined by Congress until a later amendment); Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414, 426–27 (1944) (upholding the Emergency Price Control Act’s grant of 
authority to Price Administrator to fix “fair and equitable” commodities prices). 
 23. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 132–33 (1980). 
 24. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 315–16.  
 25. Id. But see David Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the 
New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2002) 
(“Notwithstanding . . . evidence that the nondelegation doctrine has played little or no 
role in the Supreme Court’s construction of statutes, Cass Sunstein argues that the 
nondelegation doctrine is “alive and well” in the realm of statutory 
construction. . . . [T]hese canons do not implement a nondelegation doctrine.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more 
particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations 
that otherwise might be thought to be unconstitutional.”26 
Accordingly, to grasp the nature of the new nondelegation doctrine 
and the scope of legislative supremacy, we must look not to the 
Constitution’s separation of powers clauses, but to interpretive canons 
or legal maxims.  
 The “new nondelegation doctrine” applied broadly, but stopped 
short when it came to criminal law. The oft-cited Chevron case 
required courts to defer to agency interpretations of statutes within 
their scope of authority,27 but not so with agencies related to criminal 
law. Allowing the Department of Justice to guide adjudication would 
be the exemplar of the administrative fox guarding the henhouse—
notwithstanding at least one proposal to the contrary.28 If Chevron 
deference can be labeled the “quintessential prodelegation canon,”29 
then lenity can be dubbed the quintessential nondelegation canon. As 
a quasi-constitutional doctrine, it vindicates the idea of legislative 
supremacy much more than the full nondelegation doctrine ever did. 
B. Lenity as a Uniquely American Rule of Structure? 
 It seems only natural that those committed to a structural view 
of our constitutional commitments would enthusiastically promote 
the rule of lenity within the family of nondelegation canons.30 For 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7; see also Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 
1310, 1316 (1991) (noting the Court’s “general practice of applying the nondelegation 
doctrine mainly in the form of ‘giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations 
that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional’” (citing Indus. Union Dept., 
AFL–CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980))). 
 27. Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). Chevron is the single-most cited case in court opinions, and inspired an 
enormous body of academic commentary. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do 
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823, 823 (2006) (noting that Chevron is “the most cited case in modern public 
law”). For an exhaustive study, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The 
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations 
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1085 (2008) (surveying all 1014 Supreme 
Court cases between Chevron in 1983 and Hamdan in 2006).  
 28. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 469, 490–91 (1996) (acknowledging but arguing against the practice of 
not extending Chevron deference to Department of Justice interpretations of federal 
criminal laws). 
 29. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 329 (emphasis added).   
 30. Sunstein notes lenity as just one of a family of such canons. See id. at 330–
35 (listing the “nondelegation canons” that trump even the strong pull of Chevron 
deference to agency constructions of statutes that raise constitutional doubts, preempt 
state law, or infringe on the sovereignty of Native Americans). For a fuller exposition of 
lenity as a structural rule, see Zacchary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of 
Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 886 (2004) (emphasizing the nondelegation, or 
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example, Justice Scalia, who maintains that constitutional “structure 
is everything,”31 is also the Supreme Court’s primary proponent of the 
rule of lenity.32 His support seems unlikely at first blush. Because 
lenity applications often shield defendants from harsh punishment, it 
gives the impression of being pro-defendant, anti-textualist, and 
contra-legislative will; it also seems to provide a direct safeguard for 
individual rights through constraining judges from entering 
convictions in cases of doubt. Indeed, the Court and other 
commentators have understood the rule to be doing just that.33  
 Not so for Justice Scalia. For him, the rule makes sense precisely 
because it calls on judges to defer not to slippery notions of 
substantive rights, but to the express will of Congress. That is, 
Justice Scalia does not embrace lenity out of any “sentimental 
consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress 
in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct.”34 Rather, he understands 
                                                                                                                      
legislative supremacy, rationale for the rule of lenity); Note, Justifying the Chevron 
Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 2055–59 (2010) 
(detailing the legislative supremacy rationale). 
 31. Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417, 1417–18 (2008) (“In the days when I 
taught constitutional law . . . [there were] two constitutional courses. One was entitled 
Individual Rights and Liberties, and focused primarily upon guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights. The other (I forget the title of it) focused upon the structural provisions of the 
Constitution, principally the separation of powers and federalism. That was the course 
I taught—and I used to refer to it as real constitutional law. The distinctive function of 
a constitution, after all, is to constitute the political organs, the governing structure of 
a state. . . . Structure is everything.”). 
 32. Kahan, supra note 17, at 348, 390–96 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 
aggressive defense of lenity); Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory 
Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R–C.L. L. REV. 197, 205 (1994) 
(“Justice Scalia is one of the strongest supporters of lenity . . . .”).  
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 160 (1965) (strictly 
construing a statute to protect property rights in light of lenity); Callanan v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (noting that several times, “the rule of lenity was 
utilized in favorem libertatis, to resolve the ambiguity” (citing Ladner v. United States, 
358 U.S. 169 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); United States v. 
Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952))); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 
699 (1958) (applying the rule of lenity in defense of the right to travel: “We cannot 
‘assume that Congress meant to trench on [an alien’s] freedom beyond that which is 
required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.’” (citations 
omitted)); Bos. & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157 (applying lenity to protect property rights); cf. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of ‘Judicial Power’ in 
Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001) (“In my view, 
Article III judges interpreting statutes are both agents carrying out directives laid 
down by the legislature and partners in the enterprise of law elaboration, for they (like 
the legislature) are ultimately agents of ‘We the People.’”). 
 34. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an 
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this is not out 
of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress 
in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of 
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our constitutional structure to require courts to apply lenity in cases 
of doubt out of paramount concern with legislative supremacy in an 
area of law that happens to have due process implications as well. In 
his words, the separation of powers framework permits “legislatures 
and not courts [to] define criminal activity.”35 Due process 
considerations for criminal law further dictate that, because only 
legislatures should define punishable conduct, they should state “in a 
language that the common world will understand, [ ] what the law 
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so 
far as possible the line should be clear.”36 Lenity for Justice Scalia, in 
principal measure, gives voice to the otherwise weakened 
nondelegation doctrine in the important area of criminal law. Any 
benefits that accrue to the defendant are collateral and derivative of 
the constitutional structure.37  
C. American Exceptionalism in Lenity 
 Joining Justice Scalia, leading scholars of legislation and 
constitutional law have argued that lenity is so tied to a uniquely 
American constitutional structure that the only way to understand it 
is through the lens of structural considerations that reveal the proper 
extent of judicial discretion. For example, Professor John Manning 
maintains that the structural assumptions underlying the U.S. 
Constitution uniquely and radically constrain judicial discretion.38 
Taking the “judicial power” in Article III as a starting point, he 
rejects the notion that American law encompasses the old English 
common law idea of the “equity of the statute”39—the well-known 
                                                                                                                      
our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a 
harsher punishment.” (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955))). 
 35. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
 36. Id.; see also Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 131 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining lenity as “the venerable principle that ‘before a man can be 
punished as a criminal under the federal law his case must be plainly and 
unmistakably within the provisions of some statute.’” (quoting United States v. 
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917))); Arnold v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 104 
(1815) (syllabus) (“To enforce any positive rule as a law, before the individual could be 
presumed to know it, would be alike inconsistent with public justice and civil 
right. . . . In relation to positive law, that principle implies the necessity of its being 
made known before it can impose any obligation. Positive law is a manifestation of the 
legislative will; and although there may be a legislative will, it does not become a law, 
where it is not manifested.”).  
 37. Antonin Scalia, supra note 31, at 1418 (noting that individual rights and 
liberties are derivative to structure, without which the system cannot “safeguard 
individual liberty”). Indeed, scholars have long argued that lenity enjoys “quasi-
constitutional” status, in view of its link to the nondelegation doctrine concerned with 
the separation of powers articles. See Kahan, supra note 17, at 346.  
 38. John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 56 (2001). 
 39. Id. at 57. 
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practice of English judges in the eighteenth century and before40 to 
diverge from the text of the statute for equitable reasons.41 
 At common law, lenity was an equity principle used to wide 
effect in both substantive and evidentiary contexts.42 The rule 
emerged in seventeenth and eighteenth century England at a time 
when statutes imposed the death penalty for a wide range of 
offenses—from severe crimes, like murder, to minor misdemeanors, 
like petty theft.43 The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy ostensibly 
barred judges from diverging from those statutes.44 At the same time, 
judges and juries faced increased pressure to convict, even where the 
sentences seemed excessively harsh. This created a moral dilemma.45 
How could courts impose the harsh criminal sanctions in cases where 
they entertained doubt as to criminal culpability or deemed the 
sanctions wildly disproportionate to the crime?46 
                                                                                                                      
 40. Id. at 27–56 (tracing the origins of equity to Aristotelian notions that 
“equity should mitigate the defects of generally worded laws,” and noting its 
application by English courts possibly as early as the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries). 
 41. Id. at 22 (defining “equity of the statute” as a “doctrine authoriz[ing] courts 
to extend a clear statute to reach omitted cases that fell within its ration or purpose, 
and conversely, to imply exceptions to such a statute when the text would inflict harsh 
results that did not serve the statutory purpose”). 
 42. The history of lenity is elaborated at length elsewhere. For lenity 
jurisprudence in the English common law, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF 
REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2008) (discussing 
the emergence of the reasonable doubt doctrine as a version of lenity in England and 
Continental Europe) and JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 334–36 (A. W. Brian Simpson ed., 2003) (detailing the methods by 
which court officials in England avoided prosecuting criminals as a precursor to the 
formalized rule of lenity). 
 43. See LEON RADZINOWICZ, 1 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 3–4 (1948) (detailing the growing number of crimes 
punishable by death in eighteenth century England); ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, 
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT: PETTY CRIME AND THE LAW IN LONDON AND RURAL 
MIDDLESEX, C. 1660–1725 (Anthony Fletcher et al. eds., 2008).  
 44. See, e.g., ALBERT DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 60 (1885) (outlining the interaction of English courts and the legislative 
sovereignty of Parliament). 
 45. A “moral discomfort” arose time and again, particularly after the Church 
abolished the ordeals in 1215, making judges and eventually juries responsible for 
making determinations of guilt and innocence for which they believed themselves to be 
accountable before God. See WHITMAN, supra note 42, at 97–124, 129–57, 192–99 
(explaining a long history of moral dilemmas facing both judges and juries in early 
American and Continental European criminal law).  
 46. See LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 334–36 (noting the growing aversion to 
capital punishment in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England because of 
the disproportionality between criminal violations and capital punishment and because 
of the “truth-defeating” techniques of adversary procedure). On the resulting abolition 
of the death penalty, see generally BRIAN P. BLOCK & JOHN HOSTETTLER, HANGING IN 
THE BALANCE: A HISTORY OF THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN (1997) 
and JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003). 
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 Accordingly, judges devised strategies to avoid findings of guilt 
in all but the most egregious instances of criminal offenses.47 For 
example, they expanded the scope of the old “benefit of the clergy” 
doctrine, which originally exempted members of the Church from the 
criminal jurisdiction of secular courts and placed them in the more 
lenient ecclesiastical courts. The benefit became a general rule that 
allowed first-time offenders to receive more lenient sentences.48 And 
They consistently “down-charged” crimes or “downgraded” the value 
of stolen goods to arrive at a milder sentence than the statute 
otherwise required.49 And eventually, they devised the formal notion 
of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof, barring criminal 
convictions where the evidence caused significant uncertainty about 
culpability.50 Taken together, the lasting judicial iteration of these 
schemes became the common law rule of lenity: equitable principles 
of narrowing construction and reasonable doubt that were regular 
judicial practice by the early eighteenth century.51 
                                                                                                                      
 47. JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 92 (1935) (noting that judges used 
to “invent technicalities in order to avoid infliction of the capital penalty”). 
 48. See LEONA C. GABEL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER 
MIDDLE AGES (1929) (noting that the benefit was widely available at the end of the 
thirteenth century to religious “clerks” and extended in the fourteenth century to cover 
anyone who could read); PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF 
STATUTES 243 (1875) (discussing the “benefit of the clergy”); see also J. H. BAKER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 513–15 (4th ed. 2002); J. M. BEATTIE, 
CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1800, at 141–45 (1986) (giving examples of 
the benefit of the clergy); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal 
Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36–41 (1983) (same). The 
broad extension of the benefit in the seventeenth century and afterward led some 
commentators to conclude that rules of strict construction applied indiscriminately. 
E.g., Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 
748, 751 (1935) (noting that the courts’ use of “extreme technicality” to find ambiguity 
that would trigger strict construction was “unrestrained”); Kahan, supra note 17, at 
358 (calling the resulting construction from applying the benefit of clergy not just 
“narrow[ ],” but “in many cases, fantastic[ ]”).  
 49. Langbein, supra note 48, at 21–22 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 239) (detailing the methods by which court officials avoided 
prosecuting criminals, including down-charging or down-valuing goods in theft cases); 
RADZINOWICZ, supra note 43, at 83–106 (discussing the methods courts used to impose 
a lesser sentence). 
 50. WHITMAN, supra note 42, at 192–99. 
 51. There is debate about when lenity became prevalent, but agreement that it 
was in full force by the eighteenth century. See Hall, supra note 48, at 750 nn.12–13 
(tracing the consistent use of the rule of lenity back to mid-seventeenth-century 
England); RADZINOWICZ, supra note 43, at 83 (describing both an increase in legislative 
preference for capital punishment and decrease in public preference for harsh 
punishment during the eighteenth century); LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 334 (noting 
that the rule predated eighteenth-century England but did not become prevalent until 
then); WHITMAN, supra note 42, at 186–200. But see Philip M. Spector, The Sentencing 
Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 521 (2002) (“[W]hat we understand to be the 
rule of lenity—the rule that substantive criminal statutes should be interpreted 
narrowly—itself has no early British counterpart. . . . [T]he substantive rule of lenity is 
an American creation, forged in the furnace of American constitutionalism.”). 
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 According to Manning, equitable constructions like this 
expansive sort of lenity never really got off the ground on American 
shores because of a new constitutional structure that made legislative 
supremacy absolute.52 The Framers meant for the Constitution’s 
separation of powers scheme to constrain the judicial discretion 
rampant in eighteenth century England.53 Moreover, he argues, early 
American understandings of the judicial power probably meant that 
equitable readings mirroring English lenity were unpopular in favor 
of more “faithful” enforcement of the statutory texts.54 
 Spector concurs in the view that American law fundamentally 
transformed the English rule of lenity.55 Though he doubts that 
English lenity was as broad as Manning and others suggest, he too 
concludes that American lenity is a wholly new version of the rule 
tied to the American constitutional structure.56 For him, the rule that 
appeared in English courts had nothing to do with narrow or 
equitable construction of statutes themselves. There, it was only an 
evidentiary rule equivalent to “judicial nullification of exceedingly 
harsh punishments.”57 Thus it was an equitable rule of mercy that 
applied to sentencing, having nothing to do with American structure 
and rules for interpreting texts.  
 Once the rule reached American shores, in Spector’s narrative, it 
was folded into a new constitutional structure that constrained the 
equitable powers of the courts.58 Echoing Manning, Spector 
maintains that the rule came to serve “two fundamental (but largely 
procedural or structural) facets of American constitutionalism, rather 
than the substantive ends of mercy and substantive justice.”59 The 
first constitutional facet is the separation of powers—which supports 
the nondelegation rationale for lenity.60 The second is due process of 
law, the collateral benefit of structure at which Justice Scalia 
                                                                                                                      
 52. Manning, supra note 38, at 57–58. 
 53. See id. at 37–46 (noting that England lacked a strong system of separated 
powers); see also id. at 57–102 (arguing that the U.S. Constitution instituted a robust 
model of separated powers designed to limit judicial discretion rather than continue to 
allow the “flexibility implicit in a more discretionary [English] approach to statutory 
interpretation”). 
 54. See id. at 57 (“[T]he original understanding [of the Judicial Power] 
indicates that, in contrast with relevant English practice, the U.S. Constitution self-
consciously separated the judicial from the legislative power and, in doing so, sought to 
differentiate sharply the functions performed by these two distinct branches.”). 
 55. Spector, supra note 51, at 522. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 523. 
 58. Id. at 522–24. 
 59. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).  
 60. Id. at 522. 
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gestured as well.61 No longer could mercy play a role in 
determinations of guilt, however harsh the associated punishment 
might be. No longer could courts diverge from clear statutory text 
through judicial nullifying strategies, however disproportionate the 
legislated punishment. Instead courts were to faithfully apply the 
text of a clear statute. Only where the text was ambiguous could the 
courts narrowly construe its substantive provisions in recognition of 
their scaled back scope of discretion and in keeping with the ideals of 
legislative supremacy and nondelegation.62 All of this, Spector 
concludes, resulted in a uniquely American form of lenity. “[T]he rule 
of the lenity, as we understand it today,” he says, “appears to have 
been a distinctively American creation, driven by distinctively 
American concerns . . . [and] forged in the furnace of American 
constitutionalism.63 
 
—————————— 
 
 The accounts differ in the details, but Manning and Spector—
along with Justice Scalia—agree that the nondelegation doctrine 
drives a uniquely American rule of lenity. They aim to explicate the 
Judicial Power through distinguishing between the old English 
common law and the American law approaches to lenity and equity. 
For them, whereas the old English system authorized broad 
discretion (and hence lenity on the basis of equitable considerations), 
the American structure forbids it, promoting strong legislative 
supremacy instead. Manning’s and Spector’s arguments have another 
effect as well: they lead to the conclusion that American structure is 
exceptional and unique—so unique that it cannot compare to the 
English common law, and a fortiori, to other legal systems even 
farther removed. No doubt, classical Islamic law would be the last 
system they would find even remotely comparable to the American 
one concerning the function of lenity and the role of the courts. Yet, 
might the attempt to distinguish the American rule of lenity conceal 
key aspects of such rules in other contexts? Might the resulting 
inward focus present an uninformed picture of whether the American 
                                                                                                                      
 61. Id. at 535–56 (listing separation of powers and due process as the two 
primary constitutional rationales for lenity and adducing several “nonconstitutional” 
arguments for lenity as well). 
 62. Spector concludes based on this analysis that it is incoherent to apply lenity 
to sentencing statutes. Doing so ignores the fact that judicial discretion over sentencing 
is legislatively conferred. Thus, a “sentencing rule of lenity” cannot serve the structural 
and procedural purposes—nondelegation and due process—underlying the textual 
version of the lenity rule. Id. at 512. But see, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 
333, 342 (1981) (“[W]e [have] recognized that the rule of lenity is a principle of 
statutory construction which applies not only to interpretations of the substantive 
ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.”). 
 63. Spector, supra note 51, at 520–21 (emphasis added).  
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system is in fact unique, potentially obscuring important features of 
our system and its comparative value for evaluating others? For 
comparative insights, it is worth investigating how Islamic law dealt 
with questions of doubt in criminal law, and the meaning it gave to 
legislative supremacy and lenity. 
III. LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW  
 Like the nondelegation vision of American lenity, Islamic law 
has always promoted a strong form of legislative supremacy. The 
significant difference is that the medieval Islamic law version was 
stronger because it was divine and absolute. Muslims conceived of 
God as the sole Legislator; obedience to Him through implementing 
His law was sacred duty.64 Muslim theologians and jurists had a 
relatively straightforward answer to the positivist question of why 
people should follow the law: religious texts—namely the Qurʾān and 
prophetic edicts—required it. Accordingly, common slogans of Muslim 
political movements from the seventh century through the twenty-
first urge adherence to divine sovereignty, and are in fact the same 
phrases found approvingly throughout early and medieval Islamic 
jurisprudential literature: “Every rule of law comes from God” and 
“God is the [sole] Lawgiver.”65 No one—not even the Prophet 
Muḥammad, much less judges—had discretion to diverge even 
slightly from the law of God. The Prophet was simply a bearer of 
God’s message expressed through the Qurʾānic revelation.66 The 
articulation and implementation of the Prophet’s life example (as well 
as that of a series of Imāms who assumed religious leadership after 
the Prophet in Shīʿī law and theology) provide a clarifying source of 
law—which jurists refer to as the Sunna.67 The Qurʾān and Sunna 
together were taken as normative and thus form the foundational, or 
“constitutional,” sources of Islamic law. 
                                                                                                                      
 64. The only required step to falling under its aegis was recognizing one deity 
as God and Muḥammad as His last Prophet, thus triggering recognition of their 
authority over law (that is, “the rule of recognition” for Islamic contexts). Cf. H. L. A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–95 (2d ed. 1994) (“[The] ‘rule of 
recognition’ . . . specif[ies] some feature or features possession of which by a suggested 
rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be 
supported by the social pressure it exerts. The existence of such a rule of recognition 
may take any one of a wide variety of forms, simple or complex . . . . [Reducing all rules 
to writing in one place] is not itself the crucial step, though it is a very important one: 
what is crucial is the acknowledgement of reference to the writing or inscription as 
authoritative, i.e., as the proper way of disposing of doubts as to the existence of the 
rule.”). 
 65. BERNARD WEISS, SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 36 (1998).  
 66. For an overview, see Roy P. Mottahedeh, Introduction to MUḤAMMAD BĀQIR 
AṢ-ṢADR, LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 1–27 (Roy P. Mottahedeh trans., 2003). 
 67. Id. 
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 The medieval Islamic political structure did not conceive of, 
much less mandate, three separate branches of government in the 
way America and most other nations do today.68 In fact, Islamic 
political theorist typically maintained that there was no temporal 
authority over divine law at all.69 In the most basic terms, there were 
only two government branches: (1) an executive—the caliph or sulṭān 
who took charge of community leadership and was responsible for 
executing God’s law after the Prophet Muḥammad’s death70—and (2) 
“courts”—the body of judges who helped the executive implement that 
law.71 Alongside the government was a third group—legal scholars, or 
“jurists”—who developed expertise in matters of law and legal 
interpretation and thus came to be recognized as the appropriate 
agents to say what the law is.72 All were meant to be merely faithful 
agents of a divine Legislator. The Arabic term for caliph, khalīfa, 
quite literally means “agent” or “deputy.”73 The jurists aimed to carry 
on divine and prophetic teachings to aid the caliph in implementing 
God’s law. 
 In the Islamic criminal law arena, as we will see, issues of 
constitutional structure concerning the authority to interpret and 
enforce the law were most pronounced. According to Muslims, God 
drafted a series of fixed, mandatory criminal sanctions called ḥudūd, 
in the foundational sources of law (the Qurʾān and the Sunna).74 So 
explicit were these laws that Muslim leaders easily understood 
adherence to them as the prime example of upholding the doctrine of 
divine legislative supremacy. That is, even if the argument could be 
made elsewhere that God had delegated the task of elaborating the 
law, in criminal law, such an argument was extremely difficult given 
the explicit nature of the laws. Instead, early Muslims concluded that 
no one—neither political nor juristic authorities—could make or alter 
ḥudūd laws.75  
 Yet, jurists seemed to do just that through the guise of legal 
canons. Notably, they developed the ḥudūd maxim, an Islamic law 
parallel to the rule of lenity, cautioning judges to “avoid ḥudūd 
                                                                                                                      
 68. See generally A. K. S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL 
ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEORY (1981) 
(discussing the structure of Islamic government and its relation to Islam). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., PATRICIA CRONE & MARTIN HINDS, GOD’S CALIPH: RELIGIOUS 
AUTHORITY IN THE FIRST CENTURIES OF ISLAM 48–49 (1986). 
 73. Id. at 4–5. 
 74. RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6–8, 53–65 (2005). 
 75. ABŪ AL-ḤASAN AL-MĀWARDĪ, 1 KITĀB AL-ḤUDŪD MIN AL-ḤĀWĪ AL-KABĪR 100–
01 (Ibrāhīm b. ‘Ali Ṣanduqjī ed., 1995) (citing the opinion of early Iraqi judge and legal 
scholar Ibn Qutayba for the proposition that “it is impermissible for anyone to exceed 
or decrease” the scope of the law or the associated punishment). 
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sanctions in cases of doubt or ambiguity.”76 How did these jurists 
justify this maxim within Islam’s strict doctrine of legislative 
supremacy and constrained judicial discretion, especially in matters 
of criminal law? 
A. Structures of Islamic Law and Governance 
 Typical premodern Islamic legal and governmental systems 
differed significantly from modern ones. Most modern Muslim-
majority states—at least in form—tend to follow an American-style 
tri-partite structure of three branches: executive, legislative, and 
judicial.77 But medieval polities followed a different division of labor, 
owing to theological, historical, and other factors accompanying 
Islam’s advent and subsequent religio-political history.  
 When Islam first emerged in seventh century Arabia, 
Muḥammad became the religious and political head of a fledgling but 
expanding Muslim community. He claimed to be a prophet, bringing 
revelation from God, and Muslims looked to his life example for 
guidance on issues of law and morality. During his lifetime, the 
community believed that the sole legislator was God, and the Prophet 
merely an exponent of God’s legislation.78 In actual judgments, no one 
had discretion to apply anything outside of that law, not even the 
Prophet.79 This very thick version of legislative supremacy shows up 
most starkly in criminal law. To the Prophet is attributed a famous 
quote in a case where he told members of the elite who tried to 
intervene on behalf of a member of their clan, that even his hands 
were tied from pardoning a woman who had a proven record of theft: 
“Would you intervene on a matter involving God’s criminal laws 
(ḥudūd Allāh)?! . . . I swear by God that even if Fāṭima, daughter of 
Muḥammad [my own daughter], had stolen, I would cut off her 
                                                                                                                      
 76. For discussion of the origins and development of the rule, see Intisar A. 
Rabb, Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction: Ḥudūd-Avoidance 
in Cases of Doubt, 17 J. ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 63, 114–16 (2010).  
 77. Muslims form the majority of populations from Southeast Asia to Sub-
Saharan Africa, and the Organization of Islamic Conference comprises fifty-seven 
states spread over four continents. For an insightful review of constitutional structures 
and legal systems in the modern Middle East, see generally NATHAN J. BROWN, 
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS & THE PROSPECTS 
FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2001). For the role of religion in areas outside of the 
Arab Middle East, see generally ZUR ROLLE VON RELIGION IN 
DEMOKRATISIERUNGSPROZESSEN (Mirjam Künkler & Julia Leininger eds., 2009) 
(describing a comparative study of the role of religious institutions in democratic 
transition and consolidation processes). 
 78. For overviews of the legal structure during the Prophet’s lifetime and 
immediately after, see ṢUBḤĪ MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN 
ISLAM 15–16 (Farhat J. Ziadeh trans., E.J. Brill 1961) (1946) and Mottahedeh, supra 
note 66, at 4–14. 
 79. See sources cited supra note 78.  
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hand!”80 The story offers a rebuke to those who tried to encourage 
leniency for high-status offenders. Quite likely, it also represents 
later attempts to curb such practices, which had become regular 
occurrences in the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid dynasties of the eighth and 
ninth centuries.81 More generally, the anecdote is instructive for the 
view that the ḥudūd laws bound even the Prophet. 
 The Prophet’s death in 632 CE caused a crisis over succession 
that changed the political organization of the Muslim community.82 
The community emerged with a series of four caliphs who asserted 
absolute political authority and consulted with learned companions 
and family members of the Prophet about issues of law and religion.83 
The caliphs’ judicial appointments were drawn from the same ranks 
of these learned circles.84 As senior members of these circles, the 
caliphs instructed governors and judges with general policies on 
judging,85 resolved difficult legal questions,86 and often issued direct 
                                                                                                                      
 80. According to the sources, the woman—who was from a prominent clan in 
the Prophet’s own tribe of the Quraysh—used to borrow money then deny that she had 
borrowed it, amounting to theft. For records of these reports in mid-ninth century 
Sunnī canonical ḥadīth collections, see ABŪ DĀWŪD AL-SIJISTĀNĪ, 4 SUNAN 133, nos. 
4373–74 (Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Khālidī ed., 1996); AḤMAD B. SHUʿAYB AL-NASĀʾĪ, 
4 AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRĀ 330  (Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Shalabī ed., 2001); ABŪ BAKR AL-
BAYHAQĪ , 8 SUNAN 267, no. 17004 (Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭāʾ ed., 1994).  
 81. Cf. Maribel Fierro, When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt, 5 HAWWA 208, 233 
(listing cases where the ḥudūd maxim was used to benefit high-status offenders).  
 82. The Prophet’s death has been labeled the first “crisis of Muslim history.” 
MAHMOUD M. AYOUB, THE CRISIS OF MUSLIM HISTORY: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN 
EARLY ISLAM 7 (2003). Former companions of the Prophet succeeded in squashing 
breakaway groups and managed to maintain a hold on power during a period of rapid 
expansion. They made executive decisions about military campaigns, tax collection, 
and gubernatorial and other administrative appointments. See HUGH KENNEDY, THE 
PROPHET AND THE AGE OF THE CALIPHATES: THE ISLAMIC NEAR EAST FROM THE SIXTH 
TO THE ELEVENTH CENTURY 50–81 (2d ed. 1986). 
 83. These caliphs laid some claim to religio-legal authority too, though in a 
more diffused fashioned, shared with scholars who contributed to the elaboration of 
ritual, family, commercial and public law. See CRONE & HINDS, supra note 72, at 2–3 
(arguing that caliphs after Abū Bakr saw themselves not just as political authorities 
but religious authorities as well).  
 84. For example, the Prophet appointed his cousin, ʿAlī (who went on to become 
the fourth caliph and first Shīʿī Imām) and young companion Muʿādh b. Jabal to 
judgeships in Yemen during his lifetime. MUHAMMAD B. KHALAF WAKĪʿ, AKHBĀR AL-
QUḌĀT 62–72 (Saʿīd Muḥammad al-Laḥḥām, 1950). The first judges in other centers at 
the time, including Mecca, Kufa, Basra, Damascus, and Egypt, were also learned 
companions and family members who recounted prophetic practices in their own 
adjudications. See, e.g., BAYHAQĪ, supra note 80, no. 17390 (describing companion and 
Kufan judge Ibn Masʿūd’s adjudication of a criminal accusation by reference to 
prophetic practice); NASĀʾĪ, supra note 80, no. 4887 (Ibn ʿUmar reporting the Prophet’s 
application of a ḥadd sentence); AL-ḤĀKIM AL-NAYSABŪRĪ, 4 AL-MUSTADRAK ʿALĀ ʾL-
ṢAḤĪḤAYN 134 (1997). 
 85. See, e.g., ABŪ AL-ʿABBĀS AL-QALQASHANDĪ, 10 ṢUBḤ AL-AʿSHĀ 21, 79, 359 
(1981) (containing letters from the caliphs to regional governors, especially the letter 
from ʿUmar to Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī); Letter no. 53, in AL-SHARĪF AL-RAḌĪ, NAHJ AL-
BALĀGHA (Ṣubḥī al-Ṣāliḥ ed., 1967) (containing a letter sent from ʿAlī to his Malik al-
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legal rulings themselves.87 Yet, they too saw themselves as beholden 
to the supremacy of the divine law. One judicial appointment story 
has it that a scholar challenged the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb 
for the destruction of a borrowed item, and the caliph was so 
impressed with the arbiter’s reasoning—even though the decision was 
against him—that he appointed the arbiter a judge.88 
 Within decades of the Prophet’s death, the advent of Umayyad 
rule—the first of a series of dynasties—shifted the political 
organization once again.89 Government continued to have its two-
pronged structure of executive and judicial branches. But deficiencies 
of religious legitimacy and competence now forced the government 
actors to cede most interpretive authority over to the body of non-
state jurists.90 The historical sources portray the caliphate during 
this period as having gone from being an office of moral leadership 
concerned with establishing a just social order to one of tribal 
loyalties based on might-makes-right.91 The state-appointed judges 
consulted the expert “jurists”—from the learned circles of scholars92—
who continued to develop the law outside of state involvement and 
control.93 Further, the jurists formed a part of a “pious opposition” to 
                                                                                                                      
Ashtar upon sending him to Egypt to take over as governor, which explicates judicial 
policy). 
 86. See, e.g., WAKĪʿ, supra note 84, at 360 (noting that the Iraqi judge Shurayḥ 
b. al-Ḥārith wrote to ʿUmar for help in resolving issues of evidence and liability in a 
case of murder). 
 87. Most famous was the second caliph, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, who ruled for ten 
years (634–644), and instituted lasting changes to the law itself. See MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, 
supra note 78, at 110–14 (listing his precedents concerning alms-tax, divorce, slave 
law, theft, sexual crimes, and discretionary punishments). There is indication that, 
while his religio-legal authority was not absolute, judges who questioned it did so at 
their own risk. WAKĪʿ, supra note 84, at 173–75 (noting that the Basran judge Iyās b. 
Subayḥ was compared to the false prophet Musaylima when he contested the second 
caliph’s opinions on ritual purity). 
 88. WAKĪʿ, supra note 84, at 357 (appointment story of Shurayḥ, see supra note 
87). 
 89. For a survey of Muslim dynasties, including a list of Umayyad rulers, see 
CLIFFORD EDMUND BOSWORTH, THE NEW ISLAMIC DYNASTIES (2d ed. 2004).  
 90. For the early development of this shift, see generally M. QASIM ZAMAN, 
RELIGION AND POLITICS UNDER THE EARLY ʿABBĀSIDS: THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROTO-
SUNNI ELITE (1997). 
 91. AYOUB, supra note 82, at 54–57 (arguing that this transformation to tribal 
loyalty began with ʿUthmān); cf. LOUISE MARLOWE, HIERARCHY AND EGALITARIANISM 
IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT 14–16, 28 (2002) (detailing a social egalitarian bent during the 
early Islamic period that became explicitly hierarchal during ʿUthmān’s time and that 
Muʿāwiya’s assumption of leadership based on bloodlines ended “the opportunity for 
social equalising” on the basis of piety criteria). 
 92. WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 38–39 
(2005) (citing an instance where an Egyptian judge was appointed despite his lack of 
knowledge of inheritance laws).  
 93. For accounts of the early schools, beginning in the Umayyad reign and 
lasting until the formalization of legal doctrine under the early ʿAbbāsids, see generally 
NURIT TSAFRIR, THE HISTORY OF AN ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: THE EARLY SPREAD OF 
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the government, reacting to what history depicts as the widespread 
and well-known Umayyad excesses.94 In that capacity, the jurists 
insisted on divine legislative supremacy over political and religio-
legal spheres alike.95  
 The early period of the next regime, the ʿAbbāsid dynasty, saw 
the professionalization of the juristic classes as their teaching circles 
and their informal jurisprudential approaches developed into formal 
schools of law.96 All of the jurists who became the eponyms of the 
enduring schools of Islamic law lived during this time: the heads of 
the main Sunnī law schools, Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767) of the Ḥanafī school, 
Mālik (d. 795) of the Mālikī school, Shāfiʿī (d. 819) of the Shāfiʿī 
school, and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) of the Ḥanbalī school, as well as that 
of the main Shīʿī school, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 765).97 This time was also 
one of a rising textual tradition of law. During the ninth and tenth 
centuries, scholars compiled the famous collections of ḥadīth reports 
as sources for the Sunna and began to author the first full treatises 
on law (fiqh) and jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) in attempts to 
systematize the law.98 Likewise, the group that was to form the Shīʿī 
community looked to jurists from their own ranks for religious 
guidance, knowledge of which came from devotion to the teachings of 
the Prophet and his family through continued study and 
transmission.99 The fifth and sixth Imams in a line of twelve 
(Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq) were in fact so 
                                                                                                                      
ḤANAFISM (2004) and HARALD MOTZKI, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: 
MECCAN FIQH BEFORE THE CLASSICAL SCHOOLS (Marion H. Katz trans., Brill 2002) 
(1991). 
 94. See JONATHAN P. BERKEY, THE FORMATION OF ISLAM: RELIGION AND 
SOCIETY IN THE NEAR EAST, 600–1800, at 84–85 (2003) (noting that while not all of the 
opposition was religious—some of it championing Arab ascendancy—most of it was, as 
diverse pockets of scholars and other members of the elite became increasingly 
distressed at reported Umayyad divergence from Qurʾānic and prophetic principles of 
justice).  
 95. Id. 
 96. See MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, supra note 78, at 17–19. 
 97. There were dozens, if not hundreds, more. See GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE 
OF COLLEGES: INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN ISLAM AND THE WEST 2–4 (1981) 
(estimating up to five hundred such proto-Sunnī schools, most of which died out by the 
end of the ninth century). 
 98. MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, supra note 78, at 17–19 (calling this period the Golden Age, 
which accompanied the major translation movement from Greek into Arabic, the 
flowering of literature, and ʿAbbāsid patronage of the arts and sciences); see HOSSEIN 
MODARRESSI, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHĪʿĪ LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STUDY 4–5 (1984) 
(listing the four canonical Shīʿī compilations of ḥadīth—reports of the Prophet and 
Imāms’ words and practices). For discussions of the development of the ḥadīth 
compilations in Sunnī, see generally JONATHAN BROWN, THE CANONIZATION OF 
BUKHĀRĪ AND MUSLIM: THE FORMATION AND FUNCTION OF THE SUNNĪ ḤADĪTH 
TRADITION (2007) (listing the six canonical Sunnī compilations of ḥadīth—reports of the 
Prophet’s words and practices). 
 99. HOSSEIN MODARRESSI, CRISIS AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE FORMATIVE 
PERIOD OF SHĪʿITE ISLĀM 29 (1993). 
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universally well-regarded that eponyms of some Sunnī schools sought 
knowledge of the law from them as well.100 
 In this period, it became clear that caliphal power over the law 
was to be limited to issues of the public sphere, while the jurists 
maintained authority over the religio-legal spheres. Where there was 
overlap—as there was in criminal law—the two groups worked 
together under the notion that they were to adhere to the will of God 
and follow the example of the Prophet in deference to the entrenched 
notion of divine legislative supremacy.101 
B. Islamic Theories of Governance and Criminal Law 
 By the second half of the ʿAbbāsid rule, caliphs and scholars 
reached a compromise around the contours of the preceding 
generations’ understandings of political and juristic authority over 
criminal law within the confines of divine legislative supremacy. In 
the tenth and eleventh centuries, jurists from both Sunnī and Shīʿī 
communities produced definitive works of legal and political 
theory.102  
 These works of political theory more precisely laid out the 
relationship between politics and juridical scholarship concerning the 
proper divisions of labor over matters of law. The eleventh century 
jurist Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 1058) is credited as the first to 
propound a developed theory of “Islamic governance” in his book al-
Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya [Rules of Governance].103 In it, he drew on 
earlier writings on the issues to draw conclusions from the centuries-
long contests over religious and political authority.104 From the 
Prophet’s death until his time, he observed that the community had 
been forced to make difficult decisions about law and governance.105 
The constitutional sources did not speak directly to new issues that 
constantly cropped up, and this forced community leaders to exercise 
a considerable amount of interpretive agency.106 His was an attempt 
to account for the insertion of human interpretation into the legal 
                                                                                                                      
 100. For instance, Abū Ḥanīfa and others reportedly studied under him. See 
Mottahedeh, supra note 66, at 5–8. 
 101. See generally ZAMAN, supra note 90 (discussing the development of non-
state jurists as interpretive authorities). 
 102. For a history of the legal theoretical works in the Sunnī context, see WAEL 
B. HALLAQ, ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNĪ UṢŪL AL-FIQH 33 
(1997) and for the Shīʿī context, MODARRESSI, supra note 99, at 7. 
 103. ABŪ AL-ḤASAN AL-MĀWARDĪ, AL-AḤKĀM AL-SULṬĀNIYYA WAʾL-WILĀYĀT AL-
DĪNIYYA 250 (Muḥammad Fahmī al-Sirjānī ed., 1978). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See ZAMAN, supra note 90 (examining various loci of political and legal 
authority). 
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process, despite the doctrine of divine legislative supremacy with its 
accompanying version of an Islamic nondelegation doctrine. 
 In what had come to be a point of consensus by his time, only 
jurists who had received the requisite training were qualified to 
interpret Islamic law.107 However, the ruler enjoyed considerable 
discretion over issues of public law by virtue of his duties to enforce 
the law, ensure the continued existence of the community, and 
preserve the sanctity of the public sphere.108 Māwardī discussed 
these duties in terms of a ruler’s overarching obligation to vindicate 
“God’s claims” (ḥuqūq Allāh) over the community as supreme 
Legislator. This is a point to which we will return. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that enforcement of ḥudūd laws was one of the few 
public duties required of the executive, and it was the main area of 
overlap in spheres of authority claimed by the jurists who articulated 
the law, and the rulers who enforced it.109  
 In the final analysis, Māwardī articulated concisely what caliphs 
and scholars had long come to recognize: in matters of law and 
politics, each had an area of primary jurisdiction, and they were to 
work together in areas of overlap.110 The caliphs did not—and, no 
doubt, could not—assume sweeping religious authority over the 
law.111 
 This developed model of Islamic political theory comprised three 
main institutions split along secular and religious lines. Two were 
governmental: the executive had political and decision-making 
authority over enforcing criminal laws, while the judiciary, as a 
deputy to the executive, applied these laws.112 Both were to rely on a 
third institution, the non-governmental body of jurists, who had the 
institutional competence as well as the epistemic and moral authority 
to define the law, drawing from its foundational sources.113 In this 
way, Māwardī argued, the Muslim polity would remain true to its 
fundamental precepts that required using instruments of law and 
governance to implement the will of the supreme Lawgiver.114 
Between the government branches and the jurists, a separation of 
                                                                                                                      
 107.  See Intisar A. Rabb, Islamic Legal Minimalism, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LAW 
AND TRADITION *1, *13–16 (Michael Cook et al. eds., forthcoming 2012) (noting that 
mainstream Sunnī communities required trained jurists to interpret Islam’s 
foundational legal texts); cf. MODARRESSI, supra note 99, at 27–29 (noting that the 
early mainstream Imāmī Shīʿī community believed the authority of the Imāms to have 
been founded on them being learned scholars). 
 108. MĀWARDĪ, supra note 103, at 250. 
 109. See id. at 90–94 (including enforcement of ḥudūd laws in a short list of ten 
public duties that the executive authority of the state must fulfill). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See ZAMAN, supra note 90. 
 112. MĀWARDĪ, supra note 103, at 250. 
 113. See ZAMAN, supra note 90. 
 114. MĀWARDĪ, supra note 103, at 250. 
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powers of sorts obtained, with the jurists providing a check against 
the government and ensuring that it remained within the confines of 
the Law—at least symbolically if not always in fact.115  
C. Ḥudūd Crimes and Punishments 
 Against this backdrop, ḥudūd laws took on many changes in 
definition as jurists confronted actual criminal cases and tried to 
limit the punishments authorized by the state through defining the 
punishments outlined in the Islamic legal texts. The term “ḥudūd” 
refers to both the major crimes and their associated punishments in 
Islamic criminal law.116 While in theory ḥudūd laws came from God 
and humans were barred from making or altering these laws, the 
matter was less clear-cut in practice. Jurists found it difficult to 
determine the legitimate application or scope of interpretation for 
ḥudūd because of the often indeterminate nature of Islamic legal 
texts in both form and substance. The Qurʾān was a static text but 
sparse on details of law.117 The more detailed Sunna was known 
through a series of scattered ḥadīth texts of often dubious 
authenticity.118 The absence of a single code or document clearly 
detailing the law always presented questions to jurists’ inquiries as to 
just what the law was. Case in point: Muslim jurists did not even 
agree on what counted as ḥudūd laws. For example, they disputed 
whether blasphemy, highway robbery, and even murder were “true” 
(divinely legislated) ḥudūd crimes with fixed punishments—as 
detailed below. 
 The jurists did agree that Islamic law specifies at least four 
ḥudūd crimes: illicit sexual relations (such as fornication or adultery), 
defamation (specifically, slanderous accusations of sexual 
impropriety), theft, and intoxication.119 By contrast, they treated 
murder as a quasi-ḥadd crime: it was a grave offense punishable by 
death, but it involved some degree of discretion on the part of the 
victim’s family to pardon the offender and accept a set amount of 
financial compensation instead.120 This may be surprising to the 
reader familiar with modern laws of murder as the quintessential 
                                                                                                                      
 115. See id. (delineating the duties of jurists versus the executive—the former 
charged with interpreting the law, the latter with enforcing it); cf. NOAH FELDMAN, 
THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 44–48 (2008) (describing the jurists-
executive division as a separation of powers). 
 116. See, e.g., MĀWARDĪ, supra note 75, at 100–01.  
 117. See Mottahedeh, supra note 66, at 2. 
 118. Id., at 11–13. 
 119. For an overview of Islamic criminal laws, see PETERS, supra note 74, at 53–
65. 
 120. See id. at 38–53 (“In cases of homicide and bodily harm the plaintiffs may 
demand either retaliation or financial compensation.”). 
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crime. But the premodern Islamic conception came out of explicit 
Qurʾānic regulations of existing practices and corresponded to 
medieval laws of talion, the “eye-for-an-eye” doctrines that specified 
rules of retaliation or financial compensation for homicide and 
personal injury.121 In the study of Islamic law, scholars have likened 
these rules to tort law rather than criminal law.122  
 Finally, while the Islamic legal treatises often treated rebellion 
in sections accompanying criminal law, jurists typically viewed 
rebellion as a category of political resistance, which was not banned 
or criminalized by the legal sources.123 Rather, the Qurʾān bans 
brigandry and acts of terrorism, from which rebels were to be 
distinguished.124 As leading scholars of Islamic law have recently 
shown, medieval jurists developed a highly nuanced jurisprudence on 
the legality of rebellion and the treatment of rebels in a sophisticated 
line of thought that reflected Qurʾānic ideals and the historical 
circumstances of political upheaval and uncertainty in the early 
Muslim community.125 
 The short list of four or five crimes expanded and contracted as 
the criminal elements and scope of the laws often depended on the 
                                                                                                                      
 121. See Elmar Klinger, Revenge and Retribution, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
RELIGION 7779–84 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005). For examples of differing 
approaches to vengeance across time and space, see VENGEANCE IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 
87 (Kelly Gibson & Daniel Lord Smail eds., 2009) (medieval period) and MARTHA 
MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998) (modern period). 
 122. For a discussion drawing the comparison between talion and tort in the 
Islamic law context, see J. N. D. Anderson, Homicide in Islamic Law, 13 BULL. SCH. 
ORIENTAL & AFR. STUDS. 811 (1951). For perspectives on how Islamic law attempted to 
ameliorate pre-Islamic practices of private administration that often fueled ongoing 
tribal wars, see PETERS, supra note 74, at 38–53 (“The origins of this part of the law go 
back to the pre-Islamic custom of feuding, which allowed revenge for killing and bodily 
harm on all members of the tribe of the perpetrator. This often resulted in feuds that 
could last for generations. These feuds would cease if the victim’s family would accept 
compensation, to be paid collectively by all members of the tribe. With the advent of 
Islam, this institution of revenge was drastically modified. . . . The most important 
reforms were that revenge in kind could only be taken on the person of the offender 
and only after due trial.”). For the Qurʾānic regulations, see QURʾĀN 4:92 (outlining the 
laws of homicide, including compensatory rules for accidental homicide); id. 5:45 
(permitting retaliation for personal injury but encouraging financial compensation in 
its stead: “Whoever forgoes [physical retaliation in the way of charity] it shall be 
expiation for that person.”); id. 2:178–2:179 (“[T]here is life for you in qiṣāṣ, oh people of 
understanding, so that perhaps you might learn God-consciousness [restraint].”). 
 123. For a detailed treatment of the Islamic laws of rebellion, see generally 
KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW (2001) (examining 
the concept and treatment of political resistance in Islamic law). 
 124. Id. at 32. 
 125. Cf. Sherman A. Jackson, Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal 
Tradition, 91 MUSLIM WORLD 293–310 (2001) (discussing the correspondence between 
classic Islamic law and features of domestic terrorism in the United States). See 
generally ABOU EL FADL, supra note 123, at 125 (discussing the role of Muslim jurists 
in restructuring and constructing a discourse on rebellion).  
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constructions that jurists gave them.126 At times, juristic definitions 
of ḥudūd laws encompassed acts with punishments not explicitly 
mentioned in the texts of the Qurʾān or Sunna. The two most 
widespread instances of this were apostasy and highway robbery—
both of which were mentioned in the Qurʾān, but without defined 
punishments.127 Though some jurists rejected a criminal 
categorization for these acts, many jurists nevertheless counted them 
as ḥudūd crimes.128  
 In addition, jurists tinkered with the scope of ḥudūd laws by 
construing certain texts narrowly or broadly. For instance, some 
jurists counted bestiality or sodomy under the rubric of ḥudūd sex 
crimes while others restricted the ḥudūd label to illicit, heterosexual 
sex acts between two people.129 Only Ḥanafīs outlined a robust notion 
of blasphemy as a crime.130 Most jurists regarded sacrilegious 
statements against the Prophet as mere words that were not 
tantamount to apostasy, restricting the meaning of apostasy to 
explicit denials of the existence of God or the prophecy of 
Muḥammad.131 The punishments for all of these crimes were severe—
they ranged from reprimand, fines, and shaming to imprisonment, 
corporal punishment, and death.132  
 Crimes that did not fit under the ḥudūd rubric were those that 
were not clearly specified in the sources and so involved some 
                                                                                                                      
 126. Intisar A. Rabb, Doubt’s Benefit: Legal Maxims in Islamic Law, 7th–16th 
Centuries, 24–25, 263–81 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton 
University) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Intisar A. Rabb, Speech in Islamic Law and Politics, in ISLAMIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND (Anver Emon et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2012). 
 131. Id. For classifications of crimes amongst jurists from the period of the 
earliest works of law in the eighth century, see for example, ʿABD ALLĀH MUḤAMMAD 
AL-JUBŪRĪ, 2 FIQH AL-IMĀM AL-AWZĀʿĪ 30 (1977) (listing sex crimes, defamation, 
intoxication, theft—the four agreed-upon crimes—plus apostasy (ridda) and highway 
robbery (qaṭʿ al-ṭarīq)). For classifications as they had developed in the twelfth century, 
see ABŪ ḤĀMID AL-GHAZĀLĪ, 2 AL-WAJĪZ FĪ FIQH AL-IMĀM AL-SHĀFIʿĪ 163 (ʿAlī 
Muʿawwaḍ & ʿĀdil ʿAbd al-Mawjūd eds., 1997) (listing all seven); IBN RUSHD II, 2 
BIDĀYAT AL-MUJTAHID 577 (ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ & ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-
Mawjūd eds., 2000) (listing eight categories—the seven mentioned plus retaliation 
(qiṣāṣ) for murder or personal injury).  
 132. See PETERS, supra note 74, at 30–38 (listing the penalties: reprimand 
(taʾdīb), fines (ghurm, ursh), public exposure to shame (tashhīr) (which may include 
shaving the head and parading around town on the back of a donkey), banishment 
(nafy, taghrīb), imprisonment (ḥabs), flogging (jald), amputation of the hand or foot in 
some cases (qaṭʿ), cross-amputation (e.g., of the right hand and left foot) (al-qaṭʿ min 
khilāf), retaliation (qiṣāṣ) or financial compensation (diya) for personal injuries and 
murder; the death penalty (qatl) (through various methods, including lapidation (rajm) 
for adultery), sometimes in combination with crucifixion (ṣalb), and other non-punitive 
legal consequences (e.g., a bar from testifying in court)). 
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element of discretion—i.e., laws of retaliation (qiṣāṣ) and 
discretionary penalties (taʿzīr).133 Retaliation laws were discretionary 
in that they permitted a victim or her family to decide whether to 
commute like-for-like retaliation with blood money.134 The laws of 
discretionary penalties comprised the rest of the non-ḥudūd criminal 
laws—a catch-all category of acts that were considered offenses but 
never defined as such in the sources.135 Criminalization of these acts 
was justified by a combination of prior practices, political prerogative, 
and arguments about necessity.136 Though jurisdiction over these 
offenses was largely in the purview of political authorities, the jurists 
defined and specified sentence ranges for these acts too, in their 
attempts to counter-define the ḥudūd laws.137 
 Jurists did not see their interpretive activities as juridical 
legislation. To the contrary, the sources suggest that they staunchly 
subscribed to the doctrine of legislative supremacy and saw ḥudūd 
laws as authorized by nothing less than divine origins. Where a 
critical textualist or common law lawyer might see juridical 
legislation and common law crimes, most Muslim jurists conceived of 
themselves as restraining their own discretion and that of the 
political authorities in deference to the legislative supremacy of God. 
Yet, the indeterminate nature of the texts, the ambiguities 
surrounding the definition of the specified crimes compared to real-
world acts, and the high stakes of criminal convictions, drove them to 
develop firm criteria for defining the law, which may have appeared 
to be legislation in the guise of interpretation. In short, despite—or 
                                                                                                                      
 133. See id. at 65–68 (“Executive officials and judges . . . may, at their discretion, 
impose corrective punishment on those who have committed such acts.”). 
 134. Only a minority of jurists placed the laws of qiṣāṣ in the ḥudūd category. 
See, e.g., BADR AL-DĪN AL-ʿAYNĪ, 6 AL-BINĀYA FĪ SHARḤ AL-HIDĀYA 190 (Ayman Ṣāliḥ 
Shaʿbān, 1930) (noting that Bazdawī does so in his Mabsūṭ); IBN RUSHD II, supra note 
131, at 577. 
 135. PETERS, supra note 74, at 65–68. 
 136. Māwardī maintained that unspecified crimes were punishable at the 
discretion of a presiding judge according to the policy preferences of the political 
authority (siyāsa) if they constituted behavior that would compromise public order or 
the public interest (maṣlaḥa) that the caliph was charged with upholding. See 
MĀWARDĪ, supra note 75, at 1022 (maintaining that the ruler must apply taʿzīr 
punishments in instances that affect the public interest). 
 137. For the growth of these definitions to accommodate new societal situations 
and theoretical expansions in one legal school, see for example IBN ḤAJAR AL-HAYTAMĪ, 
4 TUḤFAT AL-MUḤTĀJ SHARḤ AL-MINHĀJ 160–64 (ʿAbd Allāh Maḥmūd Muḥammad 
ʿUmar ed., 2001); YAḤYĀ B. SHARAF AL-NAWAWĪ, 3 MINHĀJ AL-ṬĀLIBĪN 246 (Aḥmad b. 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ḥaddād, 2000); ABŪ ḤĀMID AL-GHAZĀLĪ, 6 AL-WASĪṬ FĪ AL-MADHHAB 
513–16 (Aḥmad Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm & Muḥammad Muḥammad Tāmir eds., 1997); 
MUḤAMMAD ZUHRĪ AL-GHAMRĀWĪ, ANWĀR AL-MASĀLIK SHARḤ ʿUMDAT AL-SĀLIK LI-
AḤMAD B. AL-NAQĪB 468 (1996); MUḤAMMAD AL-KHAṬĪB AL-SHIRBĪNĪ, 5 MUGHNĪ AL-
MUḤTĀJ ILĀ MAʿRIFAT MAʿĀNĪ ALFĀẒ AL-MINHĀJ 522–26 (ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ & 
ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd eds., 1994); SHAMS AL-DĪN MUḤAMMAD B. AḤMAD AL-
RAMLĪ, 8 NIHĀYAT AL-MUḤTĀJ ILĀ SHARḤ AL-MINHĀJ 18–22 (1938). 
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rather, because of—the doctrine of legislative supremacy, ambiguity 
and severity in ḥudūd laws made it crucial for jurists to refine the 
definitions and theory of Islamic criminal law. They not only had to 
distinguish ḥudūd laws from other criminal laws conceptually, but 
they also had to devise some principled means of arguing that they 
were upholding both the letter and the spirit of all criminal laws in a 
way that paid due deference to the divine Legislator. It is against this 
backdrop that the ḥudūd maxim was born.138 
IV. THE “ISLAMIC RULE OF LENITY”: EQUITABLE  
EXCEPTIONS TO MANDATORY SANCTIONS 
 Jurists invoked the ḥudūd maxim—“avoid imposing criminal 
sanctions in cases of doubt (idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt)”—widely 
to avoid imposing penal sanctions.139 At the same time, they insisted 
on the mandatoriness of enforcing ḥudūd laws as rules of obligation 
binding on the state.140 If ḥudūd enforcement were mandatory, the 
widespread invocation of the maxim for ḥudūd avoidance demanded 
some sort of justification within the general theories of Islamic 
criminal law and governance. Moreover, if opposition to the 
government’s selective enforcement of ḥudūd laws was at the heart of 
the jurists’ concerns and opposition to the government, they had to 
announce some principled means to determine when to avoid and 
when to enforce those laws. Toward that end, jurists elaborated 
criminal law jurisprudence in principal part through the ḥudūd 
maxim, then used that jurisprudence to articulate and give form to a 
set of public values they held to be rooted in Islam’s constitutional 
texts.141 I have previously outlined how jurists transformed the 
ḥudūd maxim into a text, which they placed on par with other 
foundational texts, thereby conferring on it the legal authority 
commensurate with its centrality.142 Here, I detail how they used the 
                                                                                                                      
 138. Like principles of lenity in the English common-law tradition, the ḥudūd 
maxim existed and was in use long before it became a formal principle of criminal law 
that appeared regularly in legal treatises together with justifications and 
enumerations of its use. See Rabb, supra note 77, at 123 (tracking reports of the ḥudūd 
maxim that attribute its use to the Prophets time and appear in the earliest surviving 
works of law and ḥadīth from the eighth and ninth centuries). 
 139. Id. at 66. 
 140. Id. at 66, 121. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Rabb, supra 77, at 69–77, 86–100.  A minority of jurists—both in the 
Sunnī and Shīʿī legal traditions—rejected the prophetic attributions of the maxim as a 
ḥadīth. See, e.g., ʿALĪ B. AḤMAD IBN ḤAZM, 12 AL-MUḤALLĀ BIʾL-ĀTHĀR 57–63 (ʿAbd al-
Ghaffār Sulaymān al-Bandārī ed., 1988); IBN ḤAZM, 7 AL-IḤKĀM FĪ UṢŪL AL-AḤKĀM 454–
55 (1968) (complaining that applications of the ḥudūd maxim were lawless because 
they contradicted the authentic texts of Islamic criminal law and would lead to a 
complete cancellation of ḥudūd laws); cf. AL-ḤURR AL-ʿĀMILĪ, 18 WASĀʾIL AL-SHĪʿA 127–
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ḥudūd maxim to form a jurisprudence that privileged principles of 
equity and fairness in the interpretation and application of criminal 
law.  
A. Equity Rationales 
 Muslim jurists used the ḥudūd maxim often as an equitable 
principle to smooth over rigidities in tight applications of the text. 
That is, they invoked the maxim whenever a failure to do so 
threatened certain sensitive “rights” or substantive values underlying 
Islamic law. Before arriving at that point, they had to first identify 
the rights and moral values enumerated by Islam’s foundational 
sources, the Qurʾān and the Sunna, then devise a theory for how to 
balance one set of rights over another. That endeavor took place in 
two stages, all within the context of the jurists’ continuing 
commitment to the theory of divine legislative supremacy. The first 
stage put the divine front and center; it was a God-centered theory of 
ḥudūd laws that laid the foundation for the second stage. That second 
stage featured arguments that were in large part human-centered 
and counter-intuitively deployed as a way of better vindicating what 
jurists took to be divine concerns with equity and justice. 
1. A Theological Theory of Ḥudūd Laws: Rules of Moral Obligation 
 In addition to distinguishing ḥudūd laws from other criminal 
offenses by defining them as acts that involved no measure of human 
discretion (unlike qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr: retaliation and discretionary 
penalties), jurists came to conceive of ḥudūd laws as rules of moral 
obligation. They initially articulated this notion through a doctrine 
contrasting a conception of ḥudūd laws as “God’s claims” or “rights” 
(ḥuqūq Allāh) with other laws, deemed “individual claims” or “rights” 
(ḥuqūq al-nās).143 These Muslims of the first three centuries did not 
mean claims or rights in the sense used in modern Western liberal 
traditions.144 Rather, early scholars understood these concepts in 
theological terms. Islamic theological notions of law defined legal 
                                                                                                                      
29 (ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Rabbānī al-Shīrāzī ed., 1963-1969) (restricting the scope of ḥudūd 
avoidance to factual rather than legal doubt based on competing traditions that advise 
a rule of precaution rather than lenity in the face of legal doubts). 
 143. See, e.g., Miriam Hoexter, Ḥuqūq Allāh and Ḥuqūq al-ʿIbād as Reflected in 
the Waqf Institution, 19 JERUSALEM STUD. ARABIC & ISLAM 133, 134 (1995); Baber 
Johansen, Sacred and Religious Element in Hanafite Law—Function and Limits of the 
Absolute Character of Government Authority, in ISLAM ET POLITIQUE AU MAGHREB 281, 
299–300 (Ernest Gellner & Jean-Claude Vatin eds., 1981) (analyzing the relationship 
between “the claims of God and the claims of men”). 
 144. For further discussion of ḥuqūq generally, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (P. 
Bearman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (s.v. ḥuqūq). 
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duties simply as a general human obligation to follow the law as an 
act of worship: God has a right to be worshipped, and individuals who 
fulfill their duties of worship have a corresponding right not to be 
punished. In other words, ḥudūd laws represent God’s claims in the 
sense that they are rules of obligation legislated by God for which 
obedience is due.145 
 Jurists writing in the two major strands of Islamic theology—
Sunnī traditionalism and Shīʿī or Muʿtazilī rationalism—came to this 
same conclusion, albeit by different means.146 Traditionalists believe 
that God has a prerogative to declare law.147 Thus, they allowed for 
seeming injustices according to a definition of justice that only God 
could understand.148 In their estimation, God demanded absolute 
obedience through adherence to the law (in this case ḥudūd laws), 
which itself defines morality. Adherence to the law meant adherence 
to morality, which should save people from punishment in the 
afterlife.149 It is on this basis that one jurist explained ḥudūd laws as 
God’s rights with reference to the following ḥadīth: “Surely, the ‘right’ 
(ḥaqq) of God upon His servants is that they worship Him and do not 
associate any partners with Him [in part, through following ḥudūd 
laws], and the ‘rights’ (ḥuqūq) of individuals vis-à-vis God is that 
whoever refrains from associating partners with God will not be 
punished.”150 
 For rationalists, by contrast, justice and morality were objective 
concepts: God only creates rules that are moral and collective reason 
usually can discern morality, and thus the law.151 Rationalists 
maintained that out of His grace, God sent Prophets (and Imāms) to 
clarify the law.152 Accordingly, God holds Himself to a divine self-
promise to punish only objectively bad acts and reward good ones—
which is exactly the sense of justice that the human mind 
comprehends.153 In juristic writings, this rationalist approach to law 
                                                                                                                      
 145. Several scholars observe that ḥudūd enforcement is obligatory because 
these crimes and punishments fall within the scope of ḥuqūq Allāh. E.g., FAKHR AL-DĪN 
AL-ZAYLAʿĪ, 3 TABYĪN AL-ḤAQĀʾIQ 539 (2000); AḤMAD B. YAḤYĀ AL-WANSHARĪSĪ, ʿUDDAT 
AL-BURŪQ FĪ JAMʿ MĀ FĪ-ʾL-MADHHAB MIN AL-JUMŪʿ WAʾL-FURŪQ 671 (Ḥamza Abū Fāris 
ed., 1990); BURHĀN AL-DĪN AL-MARGHĪNĀNĪ, 2 AL-HIDĀYA SHARḤ BIDĀYAT AL-MUBTADIʾ 
381 (Muḥammad ʿAdnān Darwīsh ed., 1966). 
 146. For a survey of the major theological strands in early Islamic thought, see 
generally J. VAN ESS, THEOLOGIE UND GESELLSCHAFT IM 2. UND 3. JAHRHUNDERT 
HIDSCHRA: EINE GESCHICHTE DES RELIGIÖSEN DENKENS IM FRÜHEN ISLAM (1991). 
 147. See Rabb, supra note 126, ch. 6.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFĪ, 1 ANWĀR AL-BURŪQ FĪ ANWĀʿ AL-FURŪQ 269–70. 
 151. See Rabb, supra note 126, ch. 6.  
 152. Id.  
 153. See MĀNKDĪM SHASHDĪW, TAʿLĪQ ʿALĀ SHARḤ AL-UṢŪL AL-KHAMSA 207–33, 
344–48, 434–79 (ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān  ed., 1965) (published as ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. 
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is famously encapsulated in the principle of correlation between 
revelation and reason: “whatever reason dictates, the Lawgiver 
legislates.”154 For rationalists, this principle applied to ḥudūd laws no 
less than any other. 
 The theological conceptions of law then place all ḥudūd laws into 
the category of God’s claims or rights in the sense of individual and 
collective obligations. The two differing trends merely explain why 
the obligations are due, in many ways mirroring the old split between 
natural law theorists and positivists in modern common and civil law 
contexts.155 For the government and legal spheres, both held a 
conception of ḥudūd that required individuals and political 
authorities alike to obey and implement ḥudūd laws as obligatory 
acts of worship. That is, individuals were to avoid committing ḥudūd 
offenses, and political authorities were obliged to punish those who 
committed them. The early legal scholars and theologians maintained 
that, only in this way would Muslim societies give shape to the moral 
order that God legislated through sharīʿa. This, at least, is the 
theological notion of ḥudūd laws-as-moral obligation.156 
2. A Legal Theory of Ḥudūd Laws: Crimes as Public-Moral Offenses 
 Over time, jurists elaborated a more sophisticated notion in 
which they took the God’s rights–individual rights dichotomy to refer 
to the public-versus-private nature of the interest offended by 
commission of a crime. Ḥudūd crimes violate God’s rights, they 
argued, in the sense of offending public morality.157 They developed 
                                                                                                                      
Aḥmad, Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa, as clarified by D. Gimaret, Les uṣūl al-ḫamsa du Qāḍī 
ʿAbd al-Gabbār et leurs commentaires,” 15 ANNALES ISLAMOLOGIQUES, 47, 49 (1979)). 
 154. See MODARRESSI, supra note 98, at 4 (describing the principle of correlation 
as “religious rules [that] may be inferred from the sole verdict of reason”). 
 155. Compare JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) 
(expressing rights in terms of natural law), with HART, supra note 64 (defining the 
obligation to obey the law with respect to rules from some recognized, authoritative 
“legislative” source). 
 156. For discussions of individual and government duties with respect to 
criminal law, see MĀWARDĪ, supra note 103, at 250 (including enforcement of ḥudūd 
laws in a short list of ten public duties that the executive authority of the state must 
fulfill); cf. ABŪ YAʿLĀ IBN AL-FARRĀʾ, AL-AḤKĀM AL-SULṬĀNIYYA 27 (Muḥammad Ḥamīd 
al-Fiqī ed., 1966) (same). 
 157. See Hoexter, supra note 143, at 133 (“Ḥuqūq Allāh refers to the rights of 
the Islamic community and religion and their claims upon the individual.”); Johansen, 
supra note 143, at 302 (arguing that Ḥanafīs established the ḥuqūq Allāh-ḥuqūq al-
ʿibād distinction to account for “political justice in the name of God” and to alleviate 
tensions between the “private and individualistic character of Hanafite law” and “the 
public interest”). For an alternative view, see Anver Emon, Ḥuqūq Allāh & Ḥuqūq al-
ʿIbād, A Legal Heuristic for a Natural Rights Regime, 13 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 325 (2006) 
(arguing that the Muslim jurists invented the doctrine of ḥuqūq Allāh as an 
interpretive mechanism used to create and distribute rights, duties, and public 
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this argument with reference to both substantive and procedural 
aspects of Islamic law. 
 Substantively, by the eleventh century, jurists extracted from 
Islamic law five core public values, which they called “objectives of 
the law: maqāṣid al-sharīʿa.”158 These jurists maintained that these 
objectives were intended to promote the preservation of life, religion, 
soundness of intellect, lineage, and property.159 They mapped these 
values onto criminal law rules, which they took as the best exemplar 
for promoting Islam’s core values.160 For example, in their conception, 
the laws of retaliation could help preserve life by limiting 
opportunities for vigilante bloodshed and blood feuds of the type that 
occurred in the pre-Islamic period.161 Apostasy laws could help 
maintain Islamic religious identity, from a time when conversion 
entailed a change in political loyalty.162 Prohibitions on intoxicants 
could help preserve the dignity of individuals in public space.163 Rules 
against sex crimes could help preserve ties of lineage and honor—ties 
that the sources reveal to have been extremely important in medieval 
Arab societies.164 And the laws against theft, fraud, highway robbery, 
and the like promoted the sanctity of private property.165  
 With these values in mind, the import of ḥudūd crimes went far 
beyond offenses against individual victims; they also infringed on the 
sense of security and preservation of Islamic law’s five core values. 
Adultery is a telling example. Muslim jurists considered adultery less 
an offense against the faithful spouse (i.e., a violation of a private 
interest) than against the notion of open infidelity (i.e., a violation of 
the public interest) in a system where marriage is the primary way to 
make sexual relations licit.166 So concerned were jurists with avoiding 
punishment when the public interest was left undisturbed, that they 
tied their own hands in many cases that bore the harshest 
punishments, like sex crimes.  The legal texts forbid fornication and 
adultery and a guilty verdict carried penalties ranging from flogging 
to death; but the texts also establish stiff evidentiary requirements to 
prove the offense—four eye-witnesses—thereby limiting the instances 
                                                                                                                      
commitments through natural law reasoning to justify rules that had no basis in 
Qurʾān or Sunna). 
 158. See GHAZĀLĪ, supra note 131; cf. AL-FĀḌIL AL-MIQDĀD AL-SUYU ̄RĪ, NAḌD AL-
QAWĀʿID AL-FIQHIYYA ʿALĀ MADHHAB AL-IMĀMIYYA 60–63 (ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Kūhkamarī 
Maḥmūd al-Marʿashī, 1983) (mentioning the five as nafs, dīn, ʿaql, nasab or ʿirḍ, and 
māl).  
 159. See, e.g., SUYŪRĪ, supra note 156, at 60–63. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 60. 
 162. Id. at 61. 
 163. Id. at 61–62. 
 164. Id. at 62. 
 165. Id. at 62–63. 
 166. See Rabb, supra note 126, at 169–70. 
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for finding ḥadd liability.167 Jurists further interpreted these texts to 
severely circumscribe means of valid prosecution in other ways. As 
noted, some limited the definition of fornication to the literal terms of 
penetration between a man and a woman; every other case was 
deemed doubt-ridden to a level sufficient to make the ḥudūd maxim 
apply to bar the sanction.168 Some also determined that judges could 
only impose punishment with uncoerced, multiple sworn confessions 
or testimony from four witnesses to the act of penetration, who 
offering uniform details of the time, manner, and place of the act.169 
Moreover, jurists encouraged sex offenders not to disclose their illicit 
affairs,170 and they constructed an elaborate law of privacy designed 
to prevent political authorities from prosecuting anything but brazen, 
public sex acts.171 They instituted a host of additional evidentiary 
safeguards as well, including rules restricting the acceptance of 
confessions, disallowing verdicts based on judicial notice, and limiting 
the use of circumstantial evidence.172 
 In other words, ḥudūd crimes like fornication or adultery were 
punishable only when they were so public as to meet the most 
stringent of standards of proof, thereby infringing on the public 
values that the ḥudūd prohibitions aimed to protect. Jurists applied 
similar arguments to the range of ḥudūd laws to articulate the moral 
norms and public values at stake when each crime was committed.173 
                                                                                                                      
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., ABŪ IBRĀHĪM ISMĀʿĪL B. YAḤYĀ AL-MUZANĪ, 9 MUKHTAṢAR 276 
(Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Nīl ed., 1993); Ibn Bābawayh, Hidāya, in 23 SILSILAT YANĀBĪʿ 
AL-FIQHIYYA 19 (ʿAlī Aṣghar Murwārīd ed., 1990); MARGHĪNĀNĪ, 4 HIDĀYA, supra note 
145, at 129.  
 170. E.g., IBRĀHĪM B. MUḤAMMAD AL-BĀJŪRĪ, ḤĀSHIYAT FATḤ AL-QARĪB 384 
(1974) (“[W]hoever publicizes or makes known his sexual transgression incurs 
[eligibility for] the ḥadd punishment.”); ZAYLAʿĪ, supra note 145, at 341–42 (arguing 
that the law encourages sex crimes to be kept private (and essentially non-
prosecutable), as four witnesses to the act would be exceedingly rare). 
 171. See generally Eli Alshech, “Do Not Enter Houses Other Than Your Own”: 
The Evolution of the Notion of a Private Domestic Sphere in Early Sunnī Islamic 
Thought, 11 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 291 (2004) (discussing conceptions of domestic privacy 
in Islamic law). For a useful discussion of how Islamic privacy laws played out in 
sodomy cases, see Seema Saifee, Note, Penumbras, Privacy, and the Death of Morals-
Based Legislation: Comparing U.S. Constitutional Law with the Inherent Right of 
Privacy in Islamic Jurisprudence, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 370, 446–48 (2003) 
(comparing Islamic legal contexts with the rule announced in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003)).  
 172. E.g., IBN IDRĪS AL-ḤILLĪ, 3 KITĀB AL-SARĀʾIR 537 (1989) (noting exceptions 
to the Sunnī bar on judicial determinations by private knowledge for offenses against 
ḥuqūq Allāh); SHAMS AL-AʾIMMA MUḤAMMAD B. AḤMAD AL-SARAKHSĪ, 9 MABSŪṬ 43, 43–
106 (Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl al-Shāfiʿī ed., 2001). For a basic 
overview of criminal procedure, see PETERS, supra note 74, at 8–17, 79–92, 142–48 
(detailing criminal procedure in classical Islamic doctrine, the pre-modern period, and 
modern Islamic criminal law) and MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, supra note 78, at 325–76. 
 173. See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text. 
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Some traditionalists even insisted that prohibitions offending no clear 
private interest—so-called victimless crimes like intoxication laws—
were not instituted for their own sake or any intrinsic moral value, 
but primarily for the preservation of public order.174  
 
—————————— 
  
 A possible conceptual wrinkle in this public–private scheme 
involved the laws of defamation, which Muslim jurists struggled to 
smooth for several centuries.175 To many, a slanderous accusation 
seemed more a private affront than a public one, which thus called 
into question the classification of this ḥadd crime as a violation of 
God’s public rights. What public interest was threatened by the 
intensely personal slight caused by defamation? Prior to the eleventh 
century, sources specified the punishment for defamation without 
making ḥuqūq classifications, as they were written before the ḥuqūq 
Allāh-ḥuqūq al-nās theory was fully elaborated. If anything, the 
sources suggested that the offense was private.176  
 By the middle of the eleventh century, however, jurists had 
developed a third category of “mixed claims” in which either God’s 
claims or private interests dominated.177 Through this new concept, 
jurists aimed to overcome the inconsistency between the private 
characteristics of defamation and the theory that all ḥudūd laws fell 
into the public ḥuqūq Allāh category. 
 Defamation proceedings typically worked in the following way: a 
plaintiff initiated an indictment by petitioning the court, producing 
evidence of the defamatory statement.178 Punishment was then due 
unless there was a fatal flaw in the evidence or the law otherwise 
provided for mitigation.179 One mitigation provision involved disputed 
effects of a plaintiff’s decision to pardon the offender.180 Jurists 
debated heatedly whether pardons of this type sufficed to avert the 
                                                                                                                      
 174. E.g., WANSHARĪSĪ, supra note 145, at 683–84 (noting a Mālikī view that the 
law does not prohibit wine drinking for its own sake, but aims to deter the harms to the 
public sphere that accompany excessive drinking and addictive behavior).  
 175. See QURʾĀN 24:4 (prohibiting false allegations of sexual impropriety and 
specifying eighty lashes as the fixed, mandatory sentence associated with proved 
utterance of such defamatory statements). For prohibitions in the ḥadīth literature, see 
for example IBN ABĪ AL-QĀSIM, 4 AL-WĀḌIḤ FĪ SHARḤ MUKHTAṢAR AL-KHIRAQĪ 421, 421–
22 (ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Duhaysh ed., 2000) (citing a prophetic ḥadīth 
instructing Muslims to “[a]void seven grave sins . . . [including] and falsely accusing 
unsuspecting, chaste, believing women”).  
 176. For instance, Shāfiʿī maintains that ḥudūd laws were legislated for the 
benefit of the plaintiff or victim. MUZANĪ, supra note 169, at 277 (citing Shāfiʿī’s later 
opinion). 
 177. See, e.g., Hoexter, supra note 143, at 134; sources cited supra note 143. 
 178. See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.  
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punishment.181 This debate turned on whether defamation was an 
offense against private interests offending only the interests of the 
addressee, or against public interests offending one of God’s rights. If 
private, plaintiff pardons should drop the punishment. If, on the 
other hand, the crime was public, plaintiff pardons should have no 
effect.182  
 Most jurists then applied this new category to defamation 
proceedings in a way that further elucidated ḥudūd laws as “God’s 
rights” that were both public and moral offenses, yet recognized the 
private nature of defamatory acts. As usual in Islamic law, jurists 
generated a plurality of opinions about just how defamation fit into 
the theory of ḥudūd laws. The balance of private and public moved on 
a sliding scale. Shāfiʿī jurists categorized defamation as almost 
exclusively a private offense.183 Thus, they allowed ḥudūd 
punishments to drop with plaintiff pardons.184 But they required 
some punishment to apply once the case was brought before a court—
as a public tribunal—and proved.185 Mālikī jurists outlined a similar 
scheme, also asserting that private claims preponderate in defamation 
cases.186 Their approach allowed plaintiff pardon to drop the 
punishment only if she desired to quash an indictment in order to 
protect her reputation.187 But as with the Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs held that 
once the indictment had reached the courts, the private nature of the 
                                                                                                                      
 181. Id.  
 182. There are at least four ways that punishment could drop: (1) plaintiff 
pardon or voluntary forfeiture of her right to bring a claim; (2) truth (taṣdīq), that is, if 
the defendant can prove that the allegedly false statement was actually true; (3) 
exculpatory evidence in the defendant’s favor to show, for example, that the defendant 
did not make the alleged statement; and (4) mutual imprecation, a process between 
husband and wife whereby, in the face of suspicions or accusations of sexual 
impropriety, each could be exonerated by both parties swearing four times that their 
respective statements were true and a fifth time invoking the curse of God if they were 
lying. See, e.g., MARʿĪ B. YŪSUF AL-MAQDISĪ, DALĪL AL-ṬĀLIB ILĀ NAYL AL-MUṬĀLIB ʿĀLA 
MADHHAB AL-IMĀM AL-MUBAJJAL AḤMAD B. ḤANBAL 254–55 (ʿAbd Allāh ʿUmar al-
Bārūdī ed., 1975); ZAYN AL-DĪN IBN NUJAYM, 1 AL-ASHBĀH WAʾL-NAẒĀʾIR 188 
(Muḥammad Muṭīʿ al-Ḥāfiẓ ed., 1983); ABŪ JAʿFAR AḤMAD AL-ṬAḤĀWĪ, MUKHTAṢAR 266 
(Abū al-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī ed., 1950). A fifth, disputed means of dropping the ḥadd 
punishment was repentance. See, e.g., MĀWARDĪ, supra note 75, at 818 (Shāfiʿī jurist 
challenging the mainstream Ḥanafī position that ḥudūd punishments could not drop by 
repentance). 
 183. See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19–20. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See, e.g., MĀWARDĪ, supra note 75, at 212–13 (classifying defamation under 
ḥuqūq al-ʿibād). But see MĀWARDĪ, supra note 103, at 433–34 (maintaining that the 
state must impose some punishment for a defamation case proved before a tribunal 
because of the ḥuqūq al-Allāh element mandating punishing ḥudūd offenses). Judges 
could completely waive punishments only in limited circumstances, as when political 
authorities made a policy decision that doing so was in the public interest. MĀWARDĪ, 2 
KITĀB AL-ḤUDŪD, supra note 75, at 1023–24. 
 186. See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19–20. 
 187. See id. 
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claim actually transferred to the public sphere, and private pardon 
could no longer have any legal effect.188   
 Ḥanafī jurists were most attentive to the public law aspects of 
the offense. They classified defamation as falling either exclusively in 
the divine claims category (in line with all other ḥudūd crimes) or as 
a mixed claim in which God’s claims dominated.189 Accordingly, 
plaintiff pardon did not affect the mandatory nature of punishment 
and was in fact deemed invalid.190 Leading Ḥanafī jurists justified 
this position by explaining the public interests intrinsic to ḥudūd 
laws. As a matter of God’s claims, the public interest required the 
state to strictly uphold these laws in order to prevent corruption in 
society and protect the sanctity of individuals’ personal security, 
property, and reputational interests on a society-wide scale.191 In the 
end, an individual could only defend her reputation (her private 
interest) if she had some assurance that the state would enforce the 
ḥudūd laws (in the public interest). So, Ḥanafīs concluded, defamation 
laws were for all intents and purposes matter of public law.192 
 Ḥanbalī jurists were the exception to the orientation that saw in 
defamation public law relevance. They maintained that defamation 
offends only individual interests.193 Accordingly, a ḥadd sentence 
could drop simply with a plaintiff’s pardon.194 Significantly, Ḥanbalī 
jurisprudence reflects the traditionalist orientation of their school, 
which never developed a notion of public–private rights that moved 
beyond the early tradition-based theological conceptions of 
obligations. 
                                                                                                                      
 188. See ABŪ BAKR B. AL-ʿARABĪ, 3 AḤKĀM AL-QURʾĀN 344 (classifying 
defamation as an offense where ḥuqūq al-ʿibād preponderates); IBN RUSHD II, supra 
note 131, at 645–48 (same); AḤMAD B. YAḤYĀ AL-WANSHARĪSĪ, 8 MIʿYĀR AL-MUʿRIB 
WAʾL-JĀMIʿ AL-MUGHRIB ʿAN FATĀWĀ AHL IFRĪQIYA WAʾL-ANDALUS WAʾL-MAGHRIB 422 
(Muḥammad Ḥajjī ed., 1981) (noting that the private ḥuqūq al-ʿibād aspects of 
defamation become public ḥuqūq Allāh concerns once a case enters the court as a public 
tribunal).  
 189. See Rabb, supra note 130, at *23–27. 
 190. See, e.g., ABŪ BAKR AL-KĀSĀNĪ, 9 BADĀʾIʿ AL-ṢANĀʾIʿ (Aḥmad Mukhtār  
ʿUthmān ed., 1968) 4212–13 (noting that the only real difference between defamation 
and other ḥudūd offenses implicating private—rather than divine—interests is that, 
once established, defamation cannot be quashed by retraction of confession). But see 
ZAYLAʿĪ, supra note 145, at 341 (observing Bazdawī’s minority position to the contrary, 
i.e., that defamation affects private interests).  
 191. See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19–20. 
 192. See, e.g., KĀSĀNĪ, supra note 190, at 4202–03 (analogizing defamation to 
theft, which also affects individual interests but is treated as a crime of ḥuqūq Allāh for 
which punishment is mandatory because of the deterrent effect in the public sphere). 
 193. See supra note 190. 
 194. E.g., MAQDISĪ, supra note 182, at 254; see, e.g., ḤASAN B. AḤMAD IBN AL-
BANNĀʾ, KITĀB AL-MUQNIʿ FĪ SHARḤ MUKHTAṢAR AL-KHIRAQĪ 1123 (ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. 
Sulaymān b. Ibrāhīm al-Baʿīnī ed., 1993); MUWAFFAQ AL-DĪN IBN QUDĀMA, 12 AL-
MUGHNĪ ʿALĀ MUKHTAṢAR ABĪ AL-QĀSIM AL-KHIRAQĪ 277–78 (ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī 
& ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw eds., 1986).  
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 The mixed claims category advocated by most Islamic legal 
schools stuck. Through it, Muslim jurists successfully negotiated the 
relationship between plaintiff pardon—which used to drop ḥadd 
liability altogether—and the mandatory nature of ḥudūd laws. Their 
compromise was that the ḥadd punishment could drop by plaintiff 
pardon so long as the matter remained between the two parties. Once 
the matter reached the courts, the punishment could not drop. In 
developing the mixed claims category of defamation, jurists 
emphasized the public aspect of defamation as a moral offense—that 
is, once in a public tribunal—for an act that was otherwise considered 
private. They extended this same understanding in their approach to 
other ḥudūd laws, balancing between public and private interests. 
That is, they constructed a two-faceted sense of most ḥudūd laws 
under which punishment for ḥudūd violations continued to be 
mandatory, but only where they affected the public sphere.  
 The sources for pre-modern Islamic criminal law theory show the 
public–private nature of the ḥuqūq Allah-ḥuqūq al-nās framework of 
sex crimes and other ḥudūd laws, and makes some sense of the high 
evidentiary standards that otherwise seem so paradoxical.195 More 
broadly, they show how jurists used criminal law to articulate Islam’s 
five core “objectives” with emphasis on the public sphere of their 
times.  This scheme reflected the core values of the societies from 
which the jurists emerged and wrote in issuing their interpretations 
of Islamic law. 
3. Giving Primacy to Private over Public, Individual over God 
 After the eleventh century developments in the concepts of public 
versus private, there was one sense in which jurists continued to 
maintain the mandatory nature of ḥudūd laws through the earlier 
theological-structural view of these laws as rules of obligation. But in 
another sense, the jurists had articulated a public-moral theory of 
ḥudūd laws that grappled with the idea of individual interests within 
the theological-structural framework. The ḥudūd maxim could 
accommodate both, and jurists used it to carve out exceptions to the 
rule of mandatory enforcement.  
 Recall that the ḥudūd maxim counsels jurists to “avoid criminal 
sanctions in cases of doubt.”196 The jurists gave teeth to this 
formulation by privileging the public-moral values that the ḥudūd 
                                                                                                                      
 195. Cf. LESLIE P. PIERCE, MORALITY TALES: LAW AND GENDER IN THE OTTOMAN 
COURT OF AINTAB 353 (2003) (“The rules of Islamic jurisprudence on bringing 
accusation of zina were so strict that some scholars of these texts have assumed that 
the courts would never see instances of adultery, fornication, or rape . . . . It is 
therefore a paradox of Islamic jurisprudence that it set up obstacles to the enforcement 
of the sexual probity it mandated.”). 
 196. See supra notes 9, 76 and accompanying text. 
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laws were supposed to uphold, insofar as they gleaned them from the 
Lawgiver, with respect to private and public interests. Avoiding the 
Lawgiver’s specific sanctions in favor of more general values sounds 
counterintuitive, but it follows the logic of ḥudūd laws as deterrents 
meant to champion public values.197  
 When a matter became so public that societal claims were at 
stake and an accused defendant clearly had violated the law, 
premodern Muslim jurists held that there was no individual harm 
that the law must consider in their calculus of whether to apply 
ḥudūd sanctions.198 The Case of the Drunken Orphan in medieval 
Islamic Iraq demonstrates the point.199 A man came to the judge Ibn 
Masʿūd with his drunken nephew asking that the boy be punished for 
being a drunkard.200 Protesting but apparently confessing to the 
charge, the young man accused his uncle of being the worst 
guardian.201 “You neither disciplined me nor covered my sin!” he 
censured, alluding to the general encouragement to avoid bringing 
criminal acts into the public sphere.202 The judge ruled that, while 
“God is (quick to) pardon and loves pardon,” a judge must impose the 
appropriate punishment for a ḥadd violation once it is raised in court 
and proved.203 He imposed the punishment for drunkenness, forty 
lashes, because the matter had become one of public record, the 
offense was proved, and lack of self-discipline was not a valid excuse 
for avoiding enforcement of the ḥadd punishment.204  
 By contrast, doubts or ambiguities in the law or the evidence 
could raise questions about individual culpability, which in turn 
would raise questions about the validity of punishing an individual 
whose conduct was only dubiously criminal or who was only 
dubiously liable. In other words, prosecution in such doubtful cases 
would run the risk of violating an individual’s personal entitlement to 
be free from harm when he is not in fact criminally culpable. For 
example, in another case in medieval Syria, a petitioner brought a 
theft complaint against a man whom he found with his belongings 
that he alleged had been stolen from him.205 The judge suggested that 
                                                                                                                      
 197. See, e.g., MUḤAMMAD B. IDRĪS AL-SHĀFIʿĪ, 8 UMM 288 (Maḥmūd al-Muṭrajī 
ed., 1993) (describing two purposes of ḥudūd laws as (1) severe punishments designed 
to deter crime, and (2) spiritual purification or rehabilitation); MĀWARDĪ, supra note 
75, at 99 (“Ḥudūd are punishments by which God deters people from committing 
prohibited [acts] and encourages them to follow [His] commands.”). 
 198. See, e.g., Rabb, supra note 126, at 248 n.45. 
 199. See BAYHAQĪ, supra note 80, no. 17391. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See WAKĪʿ, supra note 85, at 617 (detailing the case presided over by Faḍāla 
b. ʿUbayd al-Anṣārī). 
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the defendant had merely happened upon the stolen goods, and 
although appearances made it seem that the defendant had stolen 
them, there was no clear proof that he did.206 The judge was wary of 
imposing the ḥadd punishment for theft and released the defendant 
because he feared infringing on the accused’s interests in a case 
where a theft had occurred, but had not occurred so publicly or 
certainly traceable to the defendant that it warranted imposition of 
ḥudūd laws.207  
 As it turns out, the ḥudūd maxim barred ḥudūd sanctions when 
there was ambiguity about which “public rights” were at stake, but 
operated less expansively when “private rights” were at stake.208 In 
other words, whenever the more specific private interest was placed 
against the non-specific public interest, the private interest always 
took the upper hand. In this way, judges avoided impinging on the 
individual “rights” to life, religion, dignity, honor, and property that 
they saw the law to be designed first and foremost to uphold. 
 Muslim jurists of the time further explained the ḥudūd maxim in 
equitable terms when describing how it applies to a conflict of texts—
one permitting an act, the other prohibiting it and attaching criminal 
consequences. These types of cases are described in further detail 
below, as they involve issues of interpretive ambiguity as it relates to 
fair notice concerns. For now, suffice it to say that scholars invoked 
the ḥudūd maxim with respect to equitable principles delineated in 
such instances as well. For example, one scholar explained that the 
ḥudūd maxim “takes precedence . . . because the greater interest (of 
the law) is in preservation of life.”209 Moreover, he added, “ḥudūd 
(sanctions) are harsh; they must not be enforced unless there is a 
complete crime proved.”210 In other words, leading jurists maintained 
that the value placed on private interests and the high stakes of a 
ḥudūd conviction required “ḥudūd laws to be construed with 
‘lenity.’”211 
 The point, jurists intimated, was not to impose the ḥudūd 
sanctions as much as possible. In fact, an oft-quoted version of the 
ḥudūd maxim advised the exact opposite: “Avoid imposing ḥudūd 
punishments on Muslims as much as you can; if there is an 
exculpating cause for [the accused], then release him, as it is better 
that the Imām make a mistake in pardoning than in punishing.”212 
                                                                                                                      
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Rabb, supra note 126, at 173. 
 209. ʿIZZ AL-DĪN IBN ʿABD AL-SALĀM, 2 AL-QAWĀʿID AL-KUBRĀ 279–80 (Nazīh 
Kamāl Ḥammād & ʿUthmān Jumuʿa Ḍāmiriyya eds., 2007) (giving an example of a 
marriage of disputed validity). 
 210. Id. (emphasis added). 
 211. E.g., WANSHARĪSĪ, supra note 145, at 683–84 (ʿalā ʾl-taʿāṭī al-muṭlaq). 
 212. See, e.g., BAYHAQĪ, supra note 80, nos. 17057–58; ABŪ BAKR IBN ABĪ 
SHAYBA, 9 MUṢANNAF 360, no. 28972 (Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Lāḥidān & Ḥamad b. 
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Accordingly, jurists maintained that the fundamental impetus behind 
Islam’s criminal law system was to use the threat of ḥudūd sanctions 
to deter and punish proved criminal offenses, but to use the ḥudūd 
maxim equitably to uphold the law’s fundamental values, which gave 
primacy to individual private interests when there was no clear 
threat to the public sphere. 
B. Fairness Rationales 
 In addition to using it as a tool for equitable readings, Muslim 
jurists of the early period also used the ḥudūd maxim to promote 
values of fair notice. One way of making certain that offenders were 
fairly punished was to read a mens rea requirement into the law, as 
jurists of the English common law would later come to do.213 Another 
way of ensuring fair notice was to articulate a theory of ambiguity 
that accounted for the fluid nature of Islamic legal texts, for as we 
have seen, it was often difficult for jurists to agree on the contours of 
even ḥudūd laws as specimens of clear statements of law.214 Muslim 
jurists used the ḥudūd maxim to pursue both strategies. For them, 
the maxim meant that ḥudūd sanctions applied only if it could be 
proven that a defendant had intentionally violated a clear law.215 
Accordingly, the ḥudūd maxim applied easily to laws that, at least 
from a jurist’s perspective, were objectively ambiguous. Jurists also 
used the maxim to count reasonable mistake of law, ignorance, and 
mistake of fact claims as the type of doubt—from the individual 
offender’s perspective—serious enough to bar punishment.216 
1. A Broad Theory of Doubt: Legal Pluralism and Interpretive 
Ambiguity 
 Islamic law notions of clarity and ambiguity outline a wide range 
to account both for the fluid nature of Islamic legal texts and the 
                                                                                                                      
ʿAbd Allāh al-Jumuʿa eds., 2004) (same); ʿABD AL-RAZZĀQ AL-ṢANʿĀNĪ, 10 MUṢANNAF 
166, no.18698 (Ayman Naṣr al-Dīn al-Azharī ed., 2000) (same); MUḤAMMAD B. ʿĪSĀ AL-
TIRMIDHĪ, 5 SUNAN 112–13 no. 1424 (1965–1969) (same).  
 213. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) 
(“[T]he familiar proposition that ‘existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the 
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’”) (citations 
omitted); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that 
an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or 
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in 
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual 
to choose between good and evil.”). 
 214. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 215. Rabb, supra note 77, at 68. 
 216. See Rabb, supra note 126, at 263–90, 293–300. 
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multiple schools of interpretation that help to define those texts. 
Typically, textual ambiguity covers situations where the law is silent 
as to the legality of particular acts, or where there is a conflict of 
texts.217 A good example concerns male sodomy, which was an 
especially thick bone of contention between the Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī 
schools.218 The Ḥanafīs argued that the Qurʾān specified a 
punishment for zinā (male-female sex acts outside of marriage) but 
was silent on sodomy.219 Thus by definition, they maintained that 
sodomy could not be a ḥadd crime.220 But the Shāfiʿīs disagreed on 
the basis that the Qurʾān equated zinā to any gravely immoral act 
and thus mandated punishment or homosexual sodomy, or 
alternatively, that the word zinā encompassed male–male sexual 
interactions as well as male–female sex offenses.221 Whereas Shāfiʿīs 
saw clarity, Ḥanafīs saw ambiguity, and their doubt was enough to 
take sodomy out of the realm of ḥudūd laws.222  
 In this debate, the jurists focused on the scope of identifiable, 
agreed-upon Qurʾānic texts that clearly forbade zinā but were silent 
or needed construction to extend to acts of sodomy.223 Instances of 
ambiguity increased in the realm of ḥadīths, where jurists could 
rarely point to agreed-upon authoritative texts. Islamic law has a 
                                                                                                                      
 217.  In general, Muslim jurists regarded legal texts to be ambiguous when 
statements of general import engendered uncertainty as to whether and how the law 
regulated a new set of facts. This may occur when the law was silent, the scope of an 
existing and possibly related ruling was insufficiently clear, or where there were actual 
conflicts between two texts commanding two contradictory rulings. MUṢṬAFĀ 
MUḤAQQIQ DĀMĀD, 4 QAVĀʿID-I FIQH 54 (1999). 
 218. For general legal treatments of sodomy in Islam, see CHRISTIAN LANGE, 
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, AND THE MEDIEVAL MUSLIM IMAGINATION 199–214 (2008); 
KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB, BEFORE HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE ARAB-ISLAMIC WORLD, 1500–
1800, at 118–28 (2005); Arno Schmitt, Liwāṭ im Fiqh: Männliche Homosexualität, 4 J. 
ARABIC & ISLAMIC STUDS. 49–110 (2001–2002). 
 219. See ABU AL-ḤUSAYN AL-QUDŪRĪ, 11 TAJRĪD 5910–16 (Muḥammad Aḥmad al-
Sirāj & ʿAlī Jumuʿa Muḥammad eds., 2004).  
 220. Id. 
 221. See GHAZĀLĪ, supra note 131, at 440; ABŪ AL-QĀSIM AL-RĀFIʿĪ, AL-ʿAZĪZ 
SHARḤ AL-WAJĪZ 139–41 (ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ & ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd 
eds., 1997); YAḤYĀ B. SHARAF AL-NAWAWĪ, RAWḌAT AL-ṬĀLIBĪN 309 (ʿAlī Muḥammad 
Muʿawwaḍ & ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd eds., 1992). 
 222. For detailed Ḥanafī responses to Shāfiʿī arguments in favor of counting 
sodomy as a ḥadd, see QUDŪRĪ, supra note 219, at 5910–16. Worth noting is that, 
though Ḥanafīs generally dropped the ḥadd punishments, most regarded public male 
sodomy as immoral and thus punishable at the discretion of the caliph. See ZAYN AL-
DĪN IBN NUJAYM, 5 AL-BAḤR AL-RĀʾIQ 17 (1893). 
 223. Shīʿī law did not face the problem of ambiguous texts in its unequivocal 
prohibition of zinā; it cited a body of ḥadīths, consensus, and rational argumentation to 
the effect that if zinā was forbidden and had a ḥadd punishment, sodomy—which they 
regarded as a graver moral offense––should be punished even more harshly). See, e.g., 
ABŪ JAʿFAR AL-ṬŪSĪ, 2 AL-NIHĀYA FĪ MUJARRAD AL-FIQH WAʾL-FATĀWĀ 723–24 (1963); 
al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Intiṣār, in 23 SILSILAT YANĀBĪʿ AL-FIQHIYYA 49–50 (ʿAlī Aṣghar 
Murwārīd ed., 1990); Muḥammad b. Nuʿmān al-Mufīd, Muqniʿa, in 23 SILSILAT 
YANĀBĪʿ AL-FIQHIYYA 3 (ʿAlī Aṣghar Murwārīd ed., 1990).  
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problem of sources: in the realm of ḥadīth there was much 
disagreement about which texts were authoritative and normative 
bases for law.224 Even when the textual source-critics accepted the 
authenticity of ḥadīth, there was disagreement as to how jurists 
ought to resolve conflicts between them.225 Without a unified 
authoritative corpus of ḥadīth or a single code of law, each school of 
law addressed such questions through elaborate rules of 
interpretation particular to their own hermeneutical principles that 
they thought remained most faithful to the constitutional texts. 
 In this context, Sunnī jurists saw ambiguity in the very 
interpretive differences about the law between the legal schools.226 
This category of “interpretive ambiguity” underscores the extent to 
which these jurists viewed Islamic law as a juristic construct that 
accommodates a generous notion of legal pluralism: any rule that is 
valid in one Sunnī school is to be recognized as a valid legal rule.227 
In that vein, they sought to distinguish areas subject to extensive 
interpretation and debate. For them, Islamic law fell into two 
categories—clearly established rules and debatable rules.228 
 Clearly established rules are law so widespread that they can be 
presumed to be a matter of common knowledge in a given society or 
legal regime.229 Everyone in a Muslim society should know, for 
example, that Islamic law prohibits sex outside of marriage.230 In the 
earliest moments of the Muslim community, it was possible for new 
converts to claim that they were unaware of this prohibition, as 
occurred in a case during the time of the second caliph, ‘Umar. The 
caliph ruled that a Yemeni man who committed a sex crime but 
                                                                                                                      
 224. See Mottahedeh, supra note 66, at 10–13. 
 225. Id. 
 226. This is a doctrine adopted by the Shāfiʿī and Mālikī schools. Whereas for 
Mālikīs, the fact of juristic disagreement on matters well-established in another school 
is enough to give rise to a ḥadd-averting doubt, the Shāfiʿī recognition is qualified. To 
recognize rules that go against their school’s mainstream positions, Shāfiʿīs require a 
firm legal basis that would meet muster according their interpretive methods. That is, 
if a Shāfiʿī jurist examined the legal sources relied upon by other jurists for divergent 
opinions, he need only recognize them as valid if those conclusions rest on logic so 
convincing that they suggest themselves easily to an astute Shāfiʿī jurist’s mind. See, 
e.g., ABŪ AL-FAYḌ AL-MAKKĪ 2 AL-FAWĀʾID AL-JANIYYA ḤĀSHIYAT AL-MAWĀHIM AL-
SANIYYA SHARḤ AL-FAWĀʾID AL-BAHIYYA, 133–34 (Ramzī Saʿd al-Dīn al-Dimashqī ed., 
1991) ; IBN ʿABD AL- SALĀM, supra note 209, at 279–80.  
 227. See SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFĪ 142 (1996) (quoting the 
definition of legal pluralism advanced by thirteenth-century Egyptian jurist Shihāb al-
Dīn al-Qarāfī: “the ability to countenance the plurality of equally authoritative legal 
interpretations”). 
 228. E.g., QARĀFĪ, supra note 150, at 1309 (noting that the first category means 
presumed, not actual, knowledge—as indicated by its label, mashhūr, meaning 
widespread or common).  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
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claimed not to know that it was illegal was eligible for the ḥadd 
punishment only if he knew that the act was prohibited.231 The 
implication is that the man’s lack of awareness was plausible, as 
Yemen was on the margins of the community at a time when Islamic 
laws were not widespread.232 Some jurists took ‘Umar’s ruling as the 
basis for a mens rea requirement, which coincided with their 
understandings of the ḥudūd maxim.233 But more generally, jurists 
determined that Islamic law’s clear prohibitions against zinā very 
quickly became sufficiently widespread that they fell into the 
category of clearly established rules.234 Thus, a thirteenth century 
jurist ruled that a couple claiming confusion about the legality of sex 
before marriage when they planned to get married did not constitute 
the type of ambiguity that would avert a ḥadd punishment; the 
prohibition against extra-marital sex had already been clearly 
established.235 In this area of clearly established rules, courts did not 
generally entertain claims of ambiguity.236  
 “Debatable rules” refers to the detailed technical rules that have 
been the subject of juristic differences and comprise most of Islamic 
law. “Only astute jurists can discern these rules,” one jurist 
explained, and even then, they often disagree.237 Muslim jurists have 
always acknowledged the probabilistic nature of the interpretive 
endeavor and tried to account for it in various ways.238 In criminal 
law, a central way of doing this was through the elaboration of the 
                                                                                                                      
 231. See IBN NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 4. 
 232. Id. The implication is that the ability to claim ḥadd-averting doubt by way 
of ignorance about zinā prohibitions was limited to the first generations; Islamic 
prohibitions against zinā very quickly became sufficiently widespread that they fell 
into the category of clearly established rules. See also IBN QUDĀMA, supra note 194, at 
345; cf. PAUL R. POWERS, INTENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: MOTIVE AND MEANING IN MEDIEVAL 
SUNNĪ FIQH 193–94 (2006) (discussing how shubha presents a problematic legal 
principle, as it in effect means “the law only applies to those who have knowledge of the 
law”). 
 233. Prominent Ḥanafī jurists, including Ibn Māzah, ʿAynī, and Ibn ʿĀbidīn, 
imposed a knowledge requirement for zinā-liability based on ʿUmar’s judgment, with 
Ibn ʿĀbidīn specifying that to impose a ḥadd would contravene the requirements of the 
ḥudūd maxim. But other prominent Ḥanafīs rejected this view, holding that claims of 
ignorance were never appropriate in cases of sex offenses because all religions and 
communities had outlawed it. Ibn Nujaym took a strict-liability approach, holding that 
ḥudūd punishments applied whenever ḥudūd laws were violated, regardless of 
publication of the law or the offender’s knowledge. For competing positions, see IBN 
NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 4.  
 234. See IBN QUDĀMA, supra note 194, at 345. 
 235. QARĀFĪ, supra note 150, at 1309.  
 236. Rabb, supra note 126, at 306. 
 237. QARĀFĪ, supra note 150, at 1309. 
 238. This insight is the major contribution of Aron Zysow, Economy of Certainty 
90–91, 459–62 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file 
with Harvard University Library Archives).  
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ḥudūd maxim and an accompanying doctrine of doubt.239 Here, 
textual ambiguity to jurists means non-liability for the average 
person, and jurists imposed a high burden of clarity before allowing 
criminal liability.240 In other words, if even jurists could reasonably 
disagree about the substance of the law, then “ignorance is an excuse 
(for the layperson).”241  
 Consider the interpretive difference concerning valid forms of 
marriage. Islamic law initially allowed “temporary marriages,” which 
Sunnī schools later deemed illegal.242 These are marriage contracts 
wherein the couple specifies a date upon which the union will dissolve 
automatically, without divorce proceedings.243 Jurists agreed that the 
Prophet permitted this form of marriage during his lifetime, but 
disagreed as to whether the practice was subsequently outlawed.244 
Sunnī jurists concluded it was outlawed, but there is evidence that 
temporary marriages continued well into the first century, indicating 
that any prohibition must have occurred through some means beyond 
the ordinary foundational sources.245 Nevertheless, the Sunnī jurists 
came to a consensus by the mid-eighth century that temporary 
marriages were unlawful. 
 The disputed status of this form of marriage could have stiff 
consequences in criminal law because sexual relations in an invalid 
marriage opens parties up to criminal liability for zinā—where 
penalties range from flogging to death.246 Jurists invoked the ḥudūd 
maxim in such cases on the notion that, to impose criminal sanctions 
given the interpretive ambiguity about the legal status of temporary 
marriages would amount to not giving fair notice to non-jurists who 
entered into such contracts.247 Most jurists announced a general rule 
that any law deemed valid in one school would be construed as an 
ambiguity that absolves the accused of possible criminal liability in 
                                                                                                                      
 239. JALĀL AL-DĪN AL-SUYŪṬĪ, AL-ASHBĀH WAʾL-NAẒĀʾIR 237 (Muḥammad al-
Muʿtaṣim biʾllāh al-Baghdādī, 1998) (defining doubt as interpretive differences, which 
produce rules that “are legal according to some jurists but illegal according to others”.  
 240. QARĀFĪ,  supra note 150, at 1309. 
 241. Id. (emphasis added). 
 242. The Meccan School of Ibn ʿAbbās sanctioned it, as did the proto-Shīʿa in 
Medina and Kūfa. See Wilferd Madelung, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAbbās and Shīʿite Law, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE UNION EUROPÉENNE DES 
ARABISANTS ET ISLAMISANTS: LAW, CHRISTIANITY AND MODERNISM IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 
15–16, 23–25 (1998). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See PETERS, supra note 74, at 59–62 (detailing the range of punishments 
imposed for zinā under different schools of thought). 
 247. Rabb, supra note 126, at 308. 
1344   VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44:1299 
another.248 To do otherwise would be to impose criminal liability 
where the perpetrator did not have clear notice that his actions were 
proscribed, in an area where even the jurists could not agree on the 
meaning of the law. 
2. Mistake of Law or Ignorance Can Be an Excuse 
 Mistake of law covers cases where the law is clear (to the jurist) 
but confused in the mind of the layperson.249 The reasonableness of 
the mistake differs by school, along with the requirements that 
jurists impose for exercising due diligence to ascertain the law before 
claiming mistake or ignorance.250 But most insisted that to be 
reasonable, a person must have had some textual basis for thinking 
that an act was legal that was actually illegal.251 Such circumstances 
usually arose in cases of apparent conflicts of texts. An oft-repeated 
example in the sources was the case of a father taking his son’s 
property on the mistaken belief that he was entitled to do so. The 
texts are clear, as the jurists understood them, that he had no such 
entitlement.252 Yet, a prophetic statement to the effect that “a son 
and his property belong to (or are under the care of) his father” could 
provide a basis for a father’s belief—albeit mistaken—that it is 
perfectly legal to take his son’s property.253 In such cases, where the 
father lacked both knowledge of the actual law and criminal intent to 
                                                                                                                      
 248. E.g., QARĀFĪ, supra note 150, at 1307 (applying the ḥudūd maxim to a 
disputed types of marriage that Ḥanafīs validate in which a woman gets married 
without the permission of her guardian). 
 249. See, e.g., IBN NUJAYM, supra note 182, at 128. 
 250. Ḥanafīs imposed very thin diligence duties, finding ambiguity where a 
person had a reasonable basis for believing that an illegal act is legal, and applying the 
ḥudūd maxim to drop the associated punishment. In such instances, to be reasonable, 
the belief had to have simply rested upon some textual basis, even if all jurists agreed 
that the individual interpretation was incorrect. See, e.g., QUDŪRĪ supra note 219, at 
5899–900 (describing duties of due diligence before the maxim applies). Shāfiʿīs and 
Mālikīs similarly required a textual basis, but counted rules arising from interpretive 
disputes amongst jurists as texts. See, e.g., QARĀFĪ, supra note 150, at 1307–09; IBN 
ʿABD AL-SALĀM, supra note 209, at 279–80. Shīʿī jurists sharply distinguished between 
objective ambiguity (in the mind of the jurists) and subjective ambiguity (in the mind of 
individual legal agents), placing emphasis on the former for legal recognition in 
invoking the ḥudūd maxim and applying thick standards of diligence on the latter. See 
MUḤAQQIQ DĀMĀD, supra note 217, at 54–61; MUḤAMMAD AL-FĀḌIL AL-LANKARĀNĪ, AL-
QAWĀʿID AL-FIQHIYYA 21 (1995).  
 251. For an example in Mālikī law, see for example IBN RUSHD II, supra note 
131, at 261–62. 
 252. Id. 
 253. For discussions in the legal literature with citations to this ḥadīth (anta 
wa-māluk li-abīk), see AḤMAD B. ḤANBAL, 2 MUSNAD nos. 179, 204, 214 (ʿAbd Allāh al-
Darwīsh) (ḥadīth citation); IBN NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 13 (Ḥanafī discussion); 
QARĀFĪ, supra note 148, at 1309 (Mālikī discussion); SUYŪṬĪ, supra note 239, at 237 
(Shāfiʿī discussion); IBN IDRĪS, supra note 172, at 486 (Shīʿī discussion). 
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violate the law, and instead relied on his mistaken belief of legality, 
jurists applied the ḥudūd maxim to avert the ḥadd punishment for 
theft.254 
 Mere ignorance of the law could also be an excuse, as we saw in 
the case of the Yemeni Muslim convert living on the periphery of the 
central Muslim lands, who escaped ḥadd liability for a sex crime by 
claiming not to know it was illegal. For Sunnī jurists, the 
accommodation of ignorance was pragmatic and equitable. As one 
jurist put it, the ḥudūd maxim meant that judges should entertain 
claims of ignorance in areas of debatable rules, because the law was 
often too complex to expect that a layperson could or would be aware 
of its details.255 Where even jurists could not agree as to the contours 
of the law, there was ambiguity, and it would be unfair to punish 
individuals for violating ambiguous rules.256 For Shīʿī jurists, who did 
not recognize interpretive ambiguity in the Sunnī system of multiple-
school pluralism, applying the ḥudūd maxim on the basis of claims of 
ignorance is also an acknowledgement that there will be cases where 
even expert jurists cannot ascertain the law. They too maintained 
that it would be unfair to punish an individual offender where he 
simply had no notice of the law after exercising duly diligent attempts 
to ascertain it.257  
 These same jurists of course took pains not to allow this principle 
to translate into complete disregard of the law, by evaluating the 
individual claims of ignorance for plausibility.258 A criminal offense 
committed out of ignorance meant that the individual lacked the 
requisite intent to be charged with criminal culpability.259 Jurists 
thus added that the maxim should apply to reasonable claims of 
ignorance.  
                                                                                                                      
 254. See supra note 250. 
 255. QARĀFĪ, supra note 150, at 1309. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Shīʿī jurists distinguished between the person who is ignorant of the law 
but has made a good faith effort to ascertain it, and the one who has made no such 
effort. Only those who made a good faith effort or who lived far away from the centers 
of knowledge would have a bona fide claim of ignorance that would avert punishment 
for commission of the ḥadd crime. Others who could have asked an expert (mujtahid) 
but failed to do so out of willful blindness are deemed negligent, especially when acting 
in questionable areas that might implicate criminal liability; they are taken to have 
constructive notice of the law. See MUḤAQQIQ DĀMĀD, supra note 217, at 54–55, 57. 
 258. See, e.g., IBN RUSHD II, supra note 131, at 262–33 (listing cases where the 
ḥudūd maxim does not apply because there has in fact been no reliance on a legal 
ambiguity; that is, where the offender knew he was violating the law, and thus could 
not claim ignorance). 
 259. See, e.g., MAKKĪ, supra note 226, at 137 (Shāfiʿī statement); QARĀFĪ, supra 
note 150, at 1307 (Mālikī statement). 
1346   VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44:1299 
3. Mistake of Fact Can also Be an Excuse 
 As for mistake of fact, consider this example.260 Islamic law 
unambiguously prohibits wine consumption.261 What happens if a 
person finds a reddish liquid in front of her? If she has strong reason 
to believe that the liquid is juice rather than wine, even if she is 
mistaken, the maxim applies and no punishment is due.262 But if she 
is unsure what the liquid is, the maxim does not apply until and 
unless she has made diligent attempts to ascertain what the beverage 
is.263 Here too, there is no sinful or criminal intent; the mistake 
creates a doubt of the type to which the maxim applies to bar 
punishment.264 
C. Fault Lines: Strict Liability and Public-Moral Values 
 Ambiguity did not always produce the benefit of ḥudūd 
avoidance. Jurists of some schools argued in favor of strict liability for 
certain crimes, where the values at stake were so fundamental, they 
argued, that the ḥudūd maxim could not apply. In such cases, they 
advocated punishment regardless of mistake or lack of notice. 
Typically, these instances dove-tailed with clearly established rules, 
which tended to manifest the Muslim community’s closely held moral 
values and social norms. 
1. Consensus Cases of Strict Liability 
 Jurists agreed that the ḥudūd maxim would not apply to absolve 
liability from perpetrators of proved instances of rape.265 They 
indicated that no amount of claimed ignorance of the law could avert 
ḥadd liability from the perpetrator because of the gravity and the 
immorality of the crime and its violation of the private interests of 
the victim.266 The inverse was also true: the ḥudūd maxim did apply 
                                                                                                                      
 260. Factual uncertainty arises when an individual is unaware that a known 
legal rule applies to a particular set of facts. See MUḤAQQIQ DĀMĀD, supra note 217, at 
55. But in some instances, factual uncertainty may give rise to legal uncertainty as 
well. For example, when the law imposes a duty only if certain conditions are met, 
uncertainty as to whether the condition has been realized engenders uncertainty as to 
whether the law imposes a duty in the first place. See MUḤAMMAD BĀQIR AL-ṢADR, 
DURŪS FĪ ʿILM AL-UṢŪL 386–88 (1998). 
 261. See QURʾĀN 5:90. 
 262. See, e.g., QUDŪRĪ, supra note 219, at 5899 (Ḥanafī positions); QARĀFĪ, supra 
note 150, at 3107 (Mālikī positions); GHAZĀLĪ, supra note 131, at 444 (Shāfiʿī positions). 
 263. See supra note 260. 
 264. IBN ʿABD AL-SALĀM, supra note 209, at 279.  
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to the rape victim, as the lack of voluntariness was conceived as a 
ḥadd-averting doubt akin to the lack of mens rea.267 During the reign 
of the second caliph, ʿUmar averted the ḥadd sanction from a woman 
accused of zinā who claimed to have been sleeping and awoke to find 
a man atop her.268 He determined the case to be one of rape, which 
lifted criminal culpability from the woman and imposed it strictly on 
the man (though the man was no longer to be found).269 In the same 
way, jurists drew a red line around rape as a crime of strict liability. 
The prohibition against it was a well-established rule that all legal 
agents were presumed aware of and charged with respecting. Thus, 
jurists rejected any room for applying the ḥudūd maxim in these 
cases.  
2. Against Contracting Ambiguity  
 Most jurists also imposed a rule of strict liability on couples who 
were legally forbidden from marrying each other—such as siblings—
but did so anyway.270 The founder of the Ḥanafī school, Abū Ḥanīfa, 
attempted to counter that rule by proposing another type of doubt: 
contractual ambiguity. He held that legal permissions ordinarily 
flowing from a valid contract created a ḥadd-averting doubt when a 
contract was materially defective.271 He applied this rule even where 
contracting parties entered into a contract knowing of the material 
defect.272 Whereas other jurists saw such marriage contracts as void, 
Abū Ḥanīfa saw them as voidable; for him, they created at least the 
semblance of a contract.273  
                                                                                                                      
 265. Jurists uniformly avoided the ḥadd penalty when it came to rape victims, 
on the basis of the ḥadīth in which the Prophet reportedly said that members of his 
community are not liable for matters arising from coercion. See IBN QUDĀMA, supra 
note 194, at 347–48 (citing the Sunnī version of the ḥadīth: “My community is not liable 
for [consequences arising from] mistake, forgetfulness, or coercion.”); AL-WAḤĪD AL-
BIHBAHĀNĪ, AL-RASĀʾIL AL-UṢŪLIYYA 354 (1996) (citing the Shīʿī version of the ḥadīth: 
“My community is not liable in nine situations . . . [among them], mistake, 
forgetfulness, coercion, ignorance, and incapacity.”); MURTAḌĀ AL-ANṢĀRĪ, AL-RASĀʾIL 
AL-JADĪDA WAʾL-FARĀʾID AL-ḤADĪTHA 154 (ʿAlī Mishkīnī al-Ardabīlī ed., 1971) (same). 
 266. See infra note 270. 
 267. IBN QUDĀMA, supra note 194, at 347. 
 268. QUDŪRĪ, supra note 219, at 5908–09. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Many dispense with a mens rea requirement here, indicating the moral 
value they place on this rule. See IBN QUDĀMA, supra note 194, at 341 (citing late-
second- to mid-third-century jurists Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Isḥāq Ibn 
Rāhawayh, and others for the rule).  
 271. See IBN NUJAYM, supra note 182, at 128. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Ordinarily, the Islamic law of contract provides some protection for 
defective commercial transactions pursued on the mistaken belief that they were done 
under color of a contract, that is, where there was a semblance of a valid contract. Abū 
Ḥanīfa extended this norm to marriage law in his position that the semblance of a 
1348   VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44:1299 
 This example illustrates how, in Ḥanafī law, a single case could 
have two aspects—one criminal and the other commercial—and is 
thus governed by two sets of laws with differing legal outcomes. The 
commercial aspect validates such relations whenever there is a 
contract, or, according to Abū Ḥanīfa, the semblance of one.274 In such 
cases, Abū Ḥanīfa privileged contract law, using it to find semblances 
that he could then equate the legal doubt necessary to avoid 
punishment in criminal law. The effect was to avert the ḥadd 
punishment in all cases involving contracts, however knowingly 
defective.275 Yet, this effort to privilege the law of contract over other 
values ultimately failed. Most jurists, even subsequent Ḥanafīs of 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s own school, rejected his arguments.276 For them, 
adjudication on the mere basis of the sanctity of private agreements 
had to fit within, rather than override, Islamic law’s overarching 
fundamental values. Most jurists found the value Abū Ḥanīfa placed 
on private property insufficiently compelling to trump competing 
family values. 
3. Expressing Values: Structure and Substance 
 This examination of ḥudūd laws has uncovered some of the value 
commitments articulated by Muslim jurists. Though the Islamic 
approach to criminal law interpretation displays significant 
similarities to the Anglo-American tradition (especially in the broad 
commitments to fairness and equity), my goal is not to equate the 
content of those value commitments. Rather, the aim is to identify 
ways in which ḥudūd laws operated with respect to a complex set of 
public-moral values in the Islamic context and what that might say 
                                                                                                                      
marriage contract should provide protection as well, in this case, exculpating parties 
from accusations of zinā. See id. at 128.  
 274. See, e.g., AL-ʿĀLIM B. AL-ʿALĀʾ AL-ANṢĀRĪ, 5 AL-FATĀWĀ AL-ṬĀṬARKHĀNIYYA 
108–16  (Sajjād Ḥusayn ed., 1990) (discussing the differences in the chapters on 
commercial law and the chapters on criminal law). 
 275. Further examples of instances in which Abū Ḥanīfa barred punishment 
despite clear Islamic legal prohibitions against certain acts, include the following: 
sexual relations with a slavewoman held as security and contracts for the sale of wine.  
See, e.g., MUḤAMMAD AMĪN IBN ʿĀBIDĪN, 12 AL-RADD AL-MUḤTĀR ʿALĀ ʾL-DURR AL-
MUKHTĀR 61–84 (ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ & ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd eds., 
1994–1998); QĀḌĪ KHĀN AL-ŪZJANDĪ, 3 FATĀWĀ 480–89 (Sālim Muṣṭafā al-Badrī ed., 
2009); ANṢĀRĪ, supra note 274, at 108–16; IBN NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 16. 
 276. Only a minority of later Ḥanafīs followed Abū Ḥanīfa’s views of “contractual 
doubt,” often implicitly. Examples include QUDŪRĪ, supra note 219, at 5901–07 
(implicit definition) and KĀSĀNĪ, supra note 190, at 4150 (explicit definitions). Many 
Ḥanafīs, beginning with Abū Ḥanīfa’s two most prominent students, Abū Yūsuf and 
Shaybānī, objected. See IBN NUJAYM, supra note 182, at 128 (noting disagreement with 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s rule of ḥadd-avoidance by claiming reliance on a contractual ambiguity 
despite knowledge of the identity of the prohibited partner and the illegality of the 
marriage). 
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about the law’s value commitments and related interpretative 
scheme. To that end, the study also revealed interpretative processes 
at the core of Islamic criminal law, showing how jurists worked out 
the theories of criminal law through discussions and applications of 
the ḥudūd maxim—“the Islamic rule of lenity.”  
 In the process, it should have become apparent that premodern 
Muslim jurists formally saw themselves bound to the dictates of a 
divine Lawgiver through foundational legal texts, with an absolute 
form of legislative supremacy and constrained judicial discretion in 
criminal law. At the same time, in applications of the law on the 
ground, these same jurists applied equitable principles based on 
overarching public-moral values also contained in the Lawgiver’s 
foundational texts. Though they tended toward opposite outcomes, 
both maneuvers were efforts to vindicate an idea of absolute 
legislative supremacy. Jurists took the theoretical mandatoriness of 
the ḥudūd law regime outlined in constitutional texts to underscore 
the set of moral values on which they focused in actual application. 
With this in mind, they deployed the ḥudūd maxim not quite as an 
exception to criminal law rules, but as a corollary, rooted in 
provisions from Islamic legal precepts in the constitutional texts 
requiring fairness and equity.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 These interpretive processes—as revealed not only in texts but 
also in the way jurists deployed lenity on the ground—carry profound 
implications for understanding legal processes in Islamic and 
American law. In the Islamic legal process, the ḥudūd maxim reveals 
much about the institutional structure and core values underlying 
the legal system called sharīʿa as it operated historically. The maxim 
also discloses the presence of equity and limits on judicial restraint 
placed on Muslim jurists wielding interpretative authority over the 
law. In that context, legislative supremacy took on a meaning 
qualified by the core values affecting the extent to which judges 
superimposed equity concerns onto textual interpretations otherwise 
bound to rules of legislative supremacy. The lack of separated powers 
or formal legislators beyond the initial Lawgiver explains jurists’ 
emphasis on values expressed in foundational texts. It also explains 
the centrality of jurists to legal interpretation and adjudication in the 
context of Islam’s multiple legal schools.  In that vein, their inability 
to update the law formally manifested in a reliance on legal canons 
like lenity to define law and guide discretion in a vastly expanded 
judicial role.  
 Contrast this with the lenity rule in the American legal 
tradition. It too reveals core aspects of constitutional structures and 
values undergirding American legal theory. In American legal 
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process, the lenity rule appears a bellwether for how individual 
judges understand the Judicial Power.  For textualist judges, like 
Justice Scalia, using lenity as a principle of equity is illegitimate 
because it compromises strong rules of legislative supremacy and 
judicial deference in criminal law. Indeed, for him and other lenity 
proponents, equity need not enter the equation directly; textualism 
and judicial deference is enough. Where lenity must act as a 
constraint on judicial discretion, benefits may accrue to criminal 
defendants coincidentally to the motivating force behind the rule.  
Use of American lenity in that respect is quite opposite its use and 
effect in the Islamic legal context—despite sharīʿa’s more robust 
insistence on absolute legislative supremacy. 
 This historical and comparative study of lenity significantly 
informs our understandings of public law theory governing 
institutional relations and the scope of judicial discretion in criminal 
law. American lenity, as we know from the historical sources and 
judicial applications, is a recognizably judge-made principle of 
uncertain influence in the American constitutional and statutory 
interpretative scheme. Judges invoke lenity unevenly when 
approaching doubt-ridden legal texts to help guide or justify the 
extent of their own adjudicative choice. American jurists who 
champion lenity do so primarily out of nondelegation rationales.277 
Islamic lenity, as revealed from the historical and legal sources, is a 
judge-made rule too. But Muslim jurists largely obscured that fact 
once they deemed the lenity rule a text on par with other divine 
legislation. To be sure, their decisions to apply the rule were guided 
by the multiple legal schools’ distinctive methodologies and a common 
law-like notion of precedent within each. Moreover, they approached 
criminal law decisions with similar motivations to those underlying 
American structural views of lenity—a strong ideal of legislative 
supremacy, particularly over criminal law. Yet, because they had 
constructed a lenity doctrine that authorized them to expand the 
scope of their own discretion at the same time that they claimed 
fidelity to the texts and to legislative sovereignty concerns, Muslim 
jurists were able to explicitly rely on both equitable and 
nondelegation rationales to justify their decisions. The practical effect 
is this: whereas American lenity has become a fraught and limited 
tool ostensibly of judicial self-restraint, Islamic lenity emerged as a 
relatively uncontroversial and expansive tool used to justify and 
guide the exercise of judicial discretion in criminal law. In this way, 
lenity jurisprudence—inasmuch as it exemplifies the operation of 
legal canons in American and Islamic criminal law traditions—
                                                                                                                      
 277. In a separate project beyond the scope of the present study, a survey of U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions suggests that the nondelegation view of American lenity 
contends with other interpretations and disparate applications of the rule. 
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reflects and helps explain important differences in the scope of 
judicial discretion in these comparative public law contexts. 
 
 
